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Do business accelerators affect new venture performance? We investigate this question in the context 
of Start-Up Chile, an ecosystem accelerator. We focus on two treatment conditions typically found in 
business accelerators: basic services of funding and coworking space, and additional entrepreneurship 
schooling. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that schooling bundled with basic services 
can significantly increase new venture performance. In contrast, we find no evidence that basic services 
affect performance on their own. Our results are most relevant for ecosystem accelerators that attract 
young and early-stage businesses and suggest that entrepreneurial capital matters in new ventures. (JEL 
G24, L26, M13) 
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in Entrepreneurial Strategy Under Uncertainty (NS130028), Chile’s Production Development Corporation, and 
 37 
Aubrey Chernick Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. For the period of this research, Michael Leatherbee was 
part of Start-Up Chile’s Advisory Board. We thank the Editor (Francesca Cornelli) and two anonymous referees 
for detailed and insightful comments. Send correspondence to Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe, London School of 






Business accelerators are an increasingly important institutional form of entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Since the first investor-led accelerator debuted in 2005 (i.e., Y Combinator), thousands of business 
accelerators have sprung up worldwide.1 These fixed-term, cohort-based programs offer start-ups a 
combination of cash, shared office space, and entrepreneurship schooling. Accelerators distinguish 
themselves from other early-stage financiers by their strong emphasis on entrepreneurship schooling, 
which is believed to provide “entrepreneurial capital” to participants who are otherwise lacking it. 
Although evidence about “managerial capital” constraints (e.g., Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 2012; 
Bloom and Van Reenen 2010) seems to justify this emphasis, little rigorous evidence exists on the 
effect of business accelerators on new venture performance and on the importance of entrepreneurial 
capital in new firms.2 This lack of evidence is particularly pressing given the importance of new 
ventures for economic development (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1998; Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda 2013) and the relevant public and private resources being spent to foster entrepreneurial 
activity.3  
This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence of the effect of business accelerator 
programs on new venture performance. It advances prior work on accelerators that, until now, has 
focused on these programs’ conceptual definitions and has faced challenges in distinguishing the 
programs’ effects from venture selection (Cohen and Hochberg 2014). This paper also provides first-
                                                          
1 At least 4,397 institutions self-identify as an accelerator. See F6S available at https://www.f6s.com (last visited 
May 2016). 
2 By new ventures, we mean start-ups that aim at becoming large, vibrant businesses (aka transformational 
ventures) (Schoar 2010). 
3 For example, see https://www.sba.gov/blogs/sba-launches-growth-accelerator-fund. 
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time evidence on the importance of entrepreneurial capital in new ventures.4 In contrast, prior related 
work has concentrated on the role of managerial capital in established firms and nontransformational 
ventures (cf. McKenzie and Woodruff 2013).  
Business accelerators are an ideal context for studying the role of entrepreneurial capital in 
new ventures. Entrepreneurial capital refers to the set of skills and resources needed to start and grow 
nascent businesses. This type of capital can include know-how about seizing opportunities and 
growing a business (Bingham, Eisenhardt, and Furr 2007); cultivating a good reputation to attract 
employees, investors, and customers (Rao 1994; Zott and Huy 2007); and accessing valuable social 
networks (Granovetter 1973). Business accelerators’ emphasis on entrepreneurship schooling has led 
practitioners to dub these institutions “the new business schools for entrepreneurs” (Golomb 2015).5 
The exact form of this schooling varies across programs, but generally includes formal instruction 
(e.g., workshops and seminars on a wide range of entrepreneurship topics), guidance (e.g., access to 
mentors), networking opportunities, and start-up progress monitoring or accountability (Cohen and 
Hochberg 2014). Similar to how business schools can increase managerial capital, entrepreneurship 
schools in accelerators can increase entrepreneurial capital by conferring certification (cf. Spence 
1973; Arrow 1973) and increasing the productivity of founders (cf. Becker 1975). Start-ups can 
                                                          
4 Our paper also complements the work by Klinger and Schundeln (2011) and McKenzie (2015), who look at the 
impact of formal and structured business training programs offered by business plan competitions.  
5 According to Natty Zola, the Managing Director of TechStars, business accelerators are “a proven way to 
quickly grow a start-up by learning from experts, finding great mentorship and connecting to a powerful 
network. They provide resources that reduce the cost of starting a company and the early capital a team needs to 
get their venture off the ground or to achieve key early milestones. They have become the new business school” 
(Brunet, Grof, and Izquierdo 2015). We illustrate this association between business and entrepreneurship 
schools in Appendix Table 1.1. By drawing a parallel between the services offered by entrepreneurship 
schooling in a prototypical accelerator program and those offered by business schools, we unpack the 
performance-enhancing mechanisms that potentially underlie entrepreneurship schooling. 
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benefit from certification because of the large information asymmetries about the performance 
potential of these firms. They can also benefit from productivity increases, which are otherwise 
hampered by market frictions such as informational constraints. For example, some founders may 
simply be unaware of the importance of building business networks and not look for networking 
opportunities outside the accelerator.6  
Our setting is Start-Up Chile, an ecosystem accelerator aimed at high-growth, early-stage 
ventures. In contrast to investor-led accelerators (e.g., Y Combinator and TechStars), which typically 
aim to make a return on their investment, ecosystem accelerators (e.g., Village Capital and Parallel 
18) aim to stimulate start-up activity in their focal region (Clarysse, Wright, and Van Hove 2015). 
Similar to other ecosystem accelerators worldwide, Start-Up Chile offers participants an equity-free 
cash infusion, shared coworking office space, and the possibility of being selected into an exclusive 
subprogram, which we refer to as the entrepreneurship school. In addition to the potential certification 
from acceptance into the entrepreneurship school, participants are provided services typical of 
business accelerators: guidance and accountability, via monthly meetings with program staff, program 
peers, and industry experts; opportunities for networking (including representing the program at high-
profile events); and advertisement on the Start-Up Chile Web page.  
Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD), which exploits the fact that the program 
accepts a fixed number of participants every round based on an application score, we provide 
estimates of local average treatment effects of basic accelerator services (i.e., cash and coworking 
space) on start-up performance. Furthermore, exploiting a unique feature of Start-Up Chile—that only 
                                                          
6 Bloom et al. (2013) find suggestive evidence that informational frictions help explain why modern managerial 
practices are not employed by participants (before the intervention). These firms are typically ex ante unaware of 
such practices or do not believe such practices will improve performance.  
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20% of participants are selected into the entrepreneurship school, based on a business plan “pitch” 
competition and an informal qualification score cutoff—we are able to provide estimates of local 
causal effects of entrepreneurship schooling bundled with basic services, and distinguish this from the 
effect of basic services alone. 
We estimate that the combination of participation in the entrepreneurship school and access to 
the basic services of cash and coworking space leads to significantly higher venture fundraising and 
scale within the first 4.75 years of entry to the accelerator for the subpopulation “randomized in” by 
the pitch competition. Our more conservative results indicate that entrepreneurship schooling 
increases the probability of securing additional financing by 21.0%, which corresponds to a 0.29-
standard-deviation increase over the sample mean. We further estimate that entrepreneurship 
schooling results in an increase of three times the amount of capital raised, helping firms increase 
their fundraising performance, resulting in an unconditional average increase of 37,000 USD to 
112,000 USD, which is a 0.30-standard-deviation increase over the mean. Schooling also appears to 
increase venture scale: we estimate it results in a twofold increase in employees, helping firms go 
from an unconditional average of 0.9 employees to 1.8, a 0.34-standard-deviation increase over the 
sample mean. By contrast, we find no evidence that basic accelerator services of cash and coworking 
space have a treatment effect on fundraising, scale, or survival—at least not for the subpopulation of 
start-ups randomized in by the selection rule.  
An important challenge of working with start-up performance data is the collection of 
outcome measures for all accelerator applicant start-ups. Similar to prior research, we hand-collected 
Web-based performance measures for all applicants (Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar 2014; Goldfarb, 
Kirsch, and Miller 2007; Hallen, Bingham, and Cohen 2016). In addition, we collected 
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complementary outcome data using two surveys. Results based on both types of outcome metrics 
point to the same conclusion: the combination of basic services and entrepreneurship schooling in 
ecosystem accelerators is more effective than providing basic services only. This conclusion is 
consistent with recent work showing that the impact of consulting services for nontransformational 
ventures is much larger than simply improving access to capital (cf. Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 2010). 
It is also consistent with the view that entrepreneurial capital—similar to managerial capital—is a 
type of capital that is missing among certain populations (cf. Bruhn et al. 2010).  
A second empirical challenge of studying business accelerators is distinguishing between 
treatment and selection effects. The setting of Start-Up Chile provides us with the opportunity to 
advance in overcoming this challenge. Under the assumptions of no precise sorting of start-ups in the 
vicinity of the capacity cutoff for the basic services, or in the vicinity of the informal pitch 
competition qualification cutoff for the entrepreneurship school, our results estimate the local 
treatment effects of basic services and schooling around each respective cutoff. We present evidence 
in support of these identification assumptions. We also test and provide suggestive evidence against 
potential methodological concerns such as influential observations, survey- and Web-reporting biases, 
and demotivation effects on pitch competition losers. Although we cannot fully rule out these 
concerns (because we econometricians only have partial information), the preponderance of evidence 
suggests that the regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates are valid. 
In terms of the external validity of our findings, the program-level similarity between Start-
Up Chile and other ecosystem accelerators suggests that the results are representative of these types of 
programs at large. Moreover, a cross-program comparison of average applicants with a sample of 
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ecosystem accelerators worldwide sharpens the external validity of our predictions; the findings are 
particularly valid for ecosystem accelerators that attract young entrepreneurs and early-stage start-ups.  
We contribute to several bodies of research. First, a growing body of literature focuses on the 
effects of early-stage financiers on new ventures, but has mostly explored venture capital and angel 
investors (e.g., Hellman and Puri 2000, 2002; Kerr et al. 2014; Lerner et al. 2015). Our paper 
complements this stream of work by focusing on an increasingly important early-stage financier: 
business accelerators.  
Second, our results complement the emerging work on business accelerators, which we 
roughly classify into three literature streams. The first stream focuses on conceptual descriptions of 
the accelerator model (Bernthal 2015; Cohen 2013; Cohen and Hochberg 2014; Kim and Wagman 
2014; Radojevich-Kelley and Hoffman 2012). A second stream investigates the potential effects of 
accelerators on regional development (Fehder and Hochberg 2014). The third stream explores these 
programs’ potential effects on new venture outcomes and founders (Hallen et al. 2016; Yu 2016; 
Smith and Hannigan 2015; Leatherbee and Eesley 2014). Our work is most closely related to this third 
stream, which generally faces identification challenges in rigorously distinguishing the value-added 
role of business accelerator services. Our contribution is the identification of the performance-
enhancing effect of entrepreneurship schooling combined with basic services relative to basic services 
alone. Thus, we help distinguish, for the first time, which program services can affect new venture 
performance. Prior work finds suggestive evidence of how the bundle of services provided by 
accelerators can affect performance, but does not distinguish the role of any specific service. In 
particular, Hallen, Bingham, and Cohen (2016) argue that ventures can indirectly learn from the 
experience of others affiliated with the accelerator. Leatherbee and Eesley (2014) argue that founders 
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can improve their entrepreneurial opportunity discovery behaviors through their interaction with more 
active peers. Yu (2016) and Smith and Hannigan (2015) argue that accelerators can help to speed up 
success or failure by resolving the uncertainty about the inherent potential of the start-up more 
quickly.  
Third, our paper builds on the literature about firms’ management practices and business-
training programs. Consistent with the importance of managerial capital, empirical studies show a 
strong association between managerial practices and company performance (Acemoglu et al. 2007; 
Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). However, the evidence pertaining to new ventures (and thus to the 
effect of entrepreneurial rather than managerial capital) is mixed (McKenzie and Woodruff 2013) and 
mostly relates to nontransformational ventures. We contribute to this literature by distinguishing 
entrepreneurial capital from managerial capital. Whereas prior literature has defined and studied 
managerial capital as an input factor for established firms (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; de Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008; McKenzie and Woodruff 2008; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 
2016), we focus on the input factors useful for emerging transformational ventures (Schoar 2010) 
before the firm is established, when entrepreneurs are searching for the business opportunity. 
1. Institutional Setting 
1.1 Research setting 
We focus on the case of Start-Up Chile, an ecosystem accelerator launched in August 2010 and 
sponsored by the Chilean government. Its main aim is the attraction of early-stage, high-potential 
entrepreneurs from across the globe, and the transformation of the domestic entrepreneurship 
ecosystem.7 As of August 2015, approximately 1,000 start-ups had participated in the program, and 
                                                          
7 For additional details on Start-Up Chile, see Applegate et al. (2012) and Gonzalez-Uribe (2014). 
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nearly 6,000 had applied.  
Like other business accelerators worldwide, Start-Up Chile is a fixed-term, cohort-based 
program that offers participants shared office space and equity-free seed capital (roughly US$40,000 
delivered in two installments: 50% at the beginning and the remaining 50% three months later, 
conditional on survival). In addition, it offers entrepreneurship schooling to a select few participants. 
On average, each cohort consists of 100 competitively selected participants, who, similar to other 
ecosystem accelerators worldwide, relocate to the programs’ headquarters for six months.8 As 
explained in more detail below (Section 1.3), the selection process is based on the relative quality of 
the submitted application, as evaluated by external judges. At the end of their term, participating start-
ups “graduate” through a “demo day” competition (i.e., a formal presentation of the companies to 
external investors).  
Like traditional business accelerators, Start-Up Chile also offers entrepreneurship schooling. 
The unique feature in our setting, however, is that these sought-after schooling services are only 
available to a few participants. On average, 20 participants in every cohort are competitively selected 
to take part in the entrepreneurship school. As explained in more detail in Section 1.4, the selection 
procedure for the entrepreneurship school consists of a competition, dubbed “pitch-day,” where start-
ups pitch their businesses and are evaluated by judges. The schooled participants are the poster 
children of the program and, similar to other accelerators, their names are advertised on the program’s 
Web page and in specialized news releases.  
                                                          
8 Relocation of founders is a common request for participation in business accelerators. See Section 5.1 for 
additional details.  
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In addition to potential certification from acceptance into the entrepreneurship school, 
participants receive two key additional services, which are similar to the schooling services typically 
offered at business accelerators: guidance and accountability, as well as networking opportunities.9 
The guidance and accountability are imparted via 30-minute monthly meetings with program staff, 
program peers, and industry experts (no one is compensated or holds an equity stake), where 
milestones are set and entrepreneurs are held socially accountable for their self-defined strategic 
goals. Industry experts are generally Chileans connected to the Start-Up Chile network and are 
assigned to schooled participants according to industry. The networking opportunities arise because 
participants represent the program at high-profile public events and host (by holding one-on-one 
meetings) high-profile Start-Up Chile guests, such as Steve Wozniak and Paul Ahlstrom.  
1.2 Sample 
Start-Up Chile provided us with all the application data, including application scores and final 
selection decisions into the program and the entrepreneurship school, for seven cohorts. Our sample 
consists of 3,258 applicants (616 participants and 2,642 nonparticipants). Participants for generation 1 
(7) arrived in Santiago, Chile, in June 2011 (June 2013) and graduated in January 2012 (January 
2014).  
In addition, Start-Up Chile granted us access to confidential records of the pitch-day 
competitions, including pitch-day scores and final selection decisions. Because the entrepreneurship 
school was launched in generation 4, these additional data are only available for generations 4–7 and 
amount to 276 pitch-day competitors (59 schooled participants; 217 nonschooled competitors). 
                                                          
9 Business accelerators typically offer guidance/accountability and networking opportunities as part of their 
entrepreneurial schooling services. There is, however, large variation in exactly how those services are imparted. 
See Section 5.1 for additional details.  
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Based on the program’s records, we constructed six covariates to use as controls in our 
empirical strategy: the age of the entrepreneur (Age), indicator variables for domestic and female 
applicants (Chilean, Female), the natural logarithm of the number of employees (Employees before), 
and indicator variables for capital raised before application to the program (Capital raised before) and 
for start-ups that already had a working prototype or had one in development at application 
(Prototype).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sample. On average, applicant founders are 30 
years old; 21% of them are Chilean; and 14% are female. Applicant start-ups have between two and 
three employees, on average; 26% have previously raised capital; and 49% are working to develop a 
prototype or have already developed one.  
Our sample is comparable to prior research on early-stage ventures, particularly in terms of 
the number of employees (e.g., Haltiwanger et al. 2013) and industry representation (e.g., Puri and 
Zarutskie 2012) (see Appendix 2 for further details). Our sample is also comparable to the ecosystem 
business-accelerator genre. Using information from the Entrepreneurship Database (ED) program at 
Emory University,10 which has records of multiple ecosystem accelerators worldwide, we report in 
Appendix Tables 2.1 and 2.2 comparisons between the preapplication start-ups (founders) in our 
sample and those of the ED database (reported under the heading “ED”). The tables show that, 
relative to average applicants in other ecosystem accelerators worldwide, the average Start-Up Chile 
applicant is younger, less likely to be female, has a younger and more underdeveloped business, and is 
less likely to have raised capital prior to potential participation. 
1.3 Accelerator selection process 
                                                          
10 See http://goizueta.emory.edu/faculty/socialenterprise/resources/database.html. 
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Selection into the basic Start-Up Chile program is a two-part process. First, entrepreneurs submit their 
applications through an online platform operated by YouNoodle—a private company based in 
California that runs application processes for accelerator programs worldwide. YouNoodle sends the 
applications to a network of entrepreneurship experts, who judge and evaluate applications based on 
three criteria: the quality of the founding team, the merits of the project, and its potential impact on 
Chile’s entrepreneurial community. For every generation that applies to Start-Up Chile, YouNoodle 
averages the judges’ scores and ranks start-ups from best to worst. No ties are permitted: if companies 
tie, they are ranked randomly. Importantly, applicants do not know who their judges are, nor do they 
know their position in the rankings; thus it is impossible for applicants to manipulate the ranking 
process. 
Three to five expert judges are assigned randomly to each application. YouNoodle’s network 
consists of approximately 200 entrepreneurship experts: roughly 40% from Silicon Valley, 25% from 
Latin America, 20% from EMEA, and 10% from the rest of the United States. Each expert evaluates 
approximately 10 start-ups per generation, the identity of the other judges evaluating the same start-
ups is unknown, and no single judge sees all applications. Thus, judges are unlikely to be able to 
precisely manipulate the rankings (e.g., to help an applicant friend qualify).  
A committee at the Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO), which funds Start-Up 
Chile, handles the second part of the selection process, making the final decision based on 
YouNoodle’s ranking. A capacity threshold is prespecified for each cohort (normally 100),11 and the 
top-ranking companies—those ranking higher than the threshold—are typically selected.12 The 
                                                          
11 The only exception was generation 2, where the number of participants was set at 150. In unreported regressions, 
we exclude the first two generations of the program, and results are quantitatively unchanged.  
12 Highly ranked companies are assigned low rank values; for example, the top company has a rank of 1. 
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threshold corresponds to the predetermined size of the cohort, and the government determines the 
threshold as a function of its budget before the application process begins. Perfect compliance with 
the selection rule does not occur; not all applicants that meet the 100-company threshold ultimately 
participate, and not all of the accepted participants are ranked higher than the threshold. Two reasons 
explain the less-than-perfect compliance: (1) earlier stage start-ups (as opposed to established 
businesses) receive preference, especially in sectors that are not traditional to the Chilean economy, 
and (2) some selected applicants ultimately reject the offer. In the latter case, other candidates, usually 
ranking lower, are selected.  
1.4 Entrepreneurship school selection process 
Two months into the program, participants can apply to the program’s entrepreneurship school. The 
entrepreneurship school is not available to all participants, because monitoring requirements are too 
burdensome for the staff, and providing the preferential access to external speakers and staff’s 
contacts to all participants is infeasible. On average, 80% of the accelerator participants chose to 
compete for a spot in the school, and roughly 20% of competitors are selected.  
The selection procedure for the entrepreneurship school is also a two-part process, starting 
with a competition dubbed “pitch-day.” On pitch-day, competing start-ups formally present, or 
“pitch,” their business to a group of local judges (who are independent from the accelerator 
application-process judges), that is comprised of both external (i.e., staff at other private accelerators 
in Chile, e.g., Telefonica’s Wayra) and internal (i.e., staff at Start-Up Chile) members. Participants are 
allotted five minutes for their pitch, and, overall, the competition generally lasts for two hours. A 
guideline for the pitch is provided. Judges score competitors on five criteria: (1) the problem their 
business is trying to solve, (2) the proposed solution, (3) the business model, (4) the size of the 
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market, and (5) fundraising needs. Judges keep records of the scores they assign to competitors by 
criteria.  
The Start-Up Chile staff handles the second part of the selection process, making the final 
decision based on the average pitch-day scores—a weighted average of the scores per criterion across 
judges, where the weights (by criteria) are determined ex ante by Start-up Chile.13 The potential for 
precise manipulation of pitch-day scores is small. Competitors do not know the identity of judges 
until minutes prior to the competition. Moreover, the external judges have no clear incentive for 
manipulation because they have no “skin in the game.” In addition, although some judges might want 
to help a participating friend, they cannot precisely manipulate the average score: judges 
independently score each start-up across the five criteria and no one judge oversees all the scores.  
No formal restriction exists on the number of participants allowed in the entrepreneurship 
school, and 15 participants win a spot in every cohort on average. However, an informal selection rule 
is implicit in the data—competitors scoring above 3.6 are 51.9% more likely to be chosen (conditional 
on the pitch-day score; see Column 1 in Table 4). Conversations with the staff indicate that there is an 
informal rule in the reviewing process: competitors below the normative “quality bar” of a 3.6 pitch-
day score are generally desk rejected.  
This informal rule is evident in Table 2, where we summarize the number of pitch-day 
competitors and schooled participants across generations—beginning with the fourth generation, 
during which the entrepreneurial school was introduced. For ease of exposition, we group participants 
                                                          
13 We have detailed information on the pitch-day scores by criterion and by judges only for generation 6. For the 
rest of the generations, we only have access to the final (weighted average) pitch-day score. In generation 6, the 
weights used for each criterion were as follows: problem, 30%; solution, 20%; business model, 20%; market, 
20%; and fundraising needs, 10%. 
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across brackets of 0.5 pitch-day-score units. Panel A shows the distribution of average pitch-day 
scores, which concentrates around mid-range values. Column 2 shows 78% of average pitch-day 
scores are between 2.6 and 4.0, inclusive, whereas 15% (7%) of average pitch-day scores are lower 
(higher) than 2.6 (4). Panel B shows a stark jump in the probability of acceptance in to the 
entrepreneurship school between average pitch-day scores of 3.1–3.5 and 3.6–4.0, where the average 
acceptance rate of all generations increases from 8% to 54%. This jump represents a distinct and 
permanent shift in the relationship between schooling and the pitch-day score: it is present across all 
generations and thus not due to cross-sectional variation in scores across batches.14  
2. Empirical Strategy 
2.1 Exploiting the accelerator’s selection rule 
We use the capacity-threshold rule in the selection process of Start-Up Chile to estimate a local 
average treatment effect of basic accelerator services on new venture performance. This rule implies 
the probability of acceleration changes discontinuously at the capacity threshold as a function of the 
applicant’s ranking. Therefore, the difference in expected outcomes between start-ups on opposite 
sides of—but sufficiently near—the threshold can provide the basis for an unbiased local causal 
estimate. The main identification assumption is that ranks are not manipulated around the threshold. 
In this section, we begin by estimating the size of the discontinuity, and then present supportive 
evidence of the identification assumption. Finally, we describe the RDD empirical approach. 
The discontinuity in acceleration at the capacity threshold is visible in Figure 1. We plot the 
fraction of participating applicants against the normalized rank (i.e., the ranking of the start-up minus 
                                                          
14 This jump is also evident in Figure 4, where we plot the fraction of accepted participants in bins of 0.2 pitch-
day-score units. 
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the generation’s capacity threshold) calculated across bins of 10 ranks and plotted in dots. Because we 
plot acceleration against normalized ranking, higher-ranking companies are represented to the right of 
the capacity threshold, which corresponds to the 0 on the x-axis.  
We estimate the size of the discontinuity using the following equation: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝛿 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) + 𝑋𝑠′𝜎 + 𝜀𝑠, (1) 
where s indexes start-ups, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 indicates whether the start-up participated in Start-Up 
Chile, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 is a dummy that equals 1 if the start-up ranks higher than the threshold, and 𝑋𝑠 is a 
vector of controls including generation fixed effects, Age, Chilean, Female, Employees before, 
Capital raised before, and Prototype. We mitigate potential biases through high-order polynomials of 
the modified ranking (i.e., 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) of degree p) (cf. Lee and Lemieux 2010) or by 
restricting the sample to a small bandwidth of size h around the threshold (cf. Gelman and Imbens 
2014). We consider different polynomial degrees and bandwidths in order to verify that the results are 
not dependent on functional form or sample restrictions (cf. van der Klaauw 2002).  
The estimated discontinuity is sizable, significant, and robust. Table 3 presents robust 
estimates of 𝛾 across different specifications of Equation (1), with varying polynomial degrees (p) and 
rank bandwidths (h), including first-degree polynomials and 50 participants (ranks) around the 
threshold (Column 1), and additionally including generation fixed effects and controls (Column 2); as 
well as using the entire sample and including second-degree (Columns 3 and 4), third-degree 
(Columns 5 and 6), and fourth-degree polynomials (Columns 5 and 6) with and without controls. The 
coefficient of Column 7 (Column 8) implies that ranking higher than the capacity threshold increases 
the probability of acceleration by 16.6% (16.4%) relative to other start-ups in the same generation 
(and controlling for observable differences across start-ups). We plot the corresponding estimated 
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probability of schooling of the estimates in Column 7 (and the 90% confidence interval) in Figure 1; 
the discontinuity is evident. 
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the manipulation of rankings is hard in this context. Results 
from two formal tests confirm this notion. First, Figure 2 shows that no discontinuity exists around the 
capacity threshold in the density of applicants. The McCrary (2008) test for the distribution of 
applicant scores results in a discontinuity estimate of -0.026 with a standard error of 0.10. Second, 
Figure 3 demonstrates smoothness in observable covariates around the threshold; that is, companies 
ranking closely on either side of the capacity threshold are similar. We estimate Equation (1) using 
pre-determined covariates as dependent variables; Figure 3 plots such estimates against normalized 
rank. In contrast to the probability of acceleration, in no case can we reject the null hypothesis of no 
jump at the capacity threshold. 
We estimate a local average treatment effect of basic accelerator services on new venture 
performance by instrumenting 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 with the selection rule (i.e., the indicator variable 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠) in a fuzzy RDD. We estimate a system of equations using (1) above and the following: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝜋 + 𝛽𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) + 𝑋𝑠′𝜌 + 𝜖𝑠, (2) 
where 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) is a high-order polynomial of the modified ranking of the same pth 
degree like in Equation (1). As with all instrumental variable estimators, inference based on the fuzzy 
RDD is restricted to those observations that respond to the instrument; that is, applicants that are 
randomized into the accelerator by the selection rule (cf. Lee and Lemieux 2010). The main 
identification assumption is that ranking above the threshold is as good as random in the vicinity of 
the capacity threshold. In that case, the RDD estimates a local average treatment effect, even if 
selection into the program is made on the basis of prospective gains (cf. Roberts and Whited 2013).  
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2.2 Exploiting the informal rule of the entrepreneurship school’s selection process  
We use the informal rule in the selection process of the entrepreneurship school to estimate a local 
average treatment effect of the combination of schooling and basic services on new-venture 
performance. Our approach is similar to other papers in the literature exploiting de facto 
discontinuities in selection systems (Kerr et al. 2014). Because the probability of schooling changes 
discontinuously at the 3.6 pitch-day score, the difference in expected outcomes between start-ups on 
opposite sides of—but sufficiently near—the threshold can thus provide the basis for an unbiased 
local causal estimate. The main identification concern is that competitors are manipulated around the 
3.6 pitch-day score. As mentioned in Section 1.4, precise manipulation is hard: competitors do not 
know the identity of judges beforehand, judges independently score each start-up, no judge oversees 
all the scores, and final pitch-day scores are a linear function of the judges’ scores. Nonetheless, such 
potential manipulation is of particular concern here because the pitch-day threshold does not 
correspond to a formal rule in the program (in contrast to the capacity threshold of basic services). In 
this section, we begin by estimating the size of the discontinuity. We then present evidence that is 
supportive of no manipulation. Finally, we describe the RDD empirical approach. 
We estimate the size of the discontinuity in the probability of schooling at the 3.6 pitch-day 
threshold using the following equation: 
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 = 𝜏 + 𝜇𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 + 𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) + 𝑍𝑠′𝜙 + 𝜀𝑠, (3) 
where the outcome variable school is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant received 
schooling, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣e is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant scored 3.6 or higher on the 
pitch-day, and 𝑍𝑠 indicates controls that vary across specifications. We mitigate potential biases by 
restricting the sample to a small bandwidth of pitch-day scores of size h around the threshold, and 
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using polynomials (i.e., 𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) of degree p) (Gelman and Imbens 2014). The 
coefficient 𝜇 in Equation (3) is a measure of the size of the discontinuity.  
The estimated discontinuity is sizable and significant. Column 1 (2) of Table 4 presents the 
estimate of 𝜇 from a specification of Equation (3) using a first-degree polynomial, the entire sample, 
and excluding (including) controls. The coefficient of Column 1 (2) implies that scoring above the 
informal quality bar of 3.6 in the pitch-day score increases the probability of schooling by 51.9% 
(50.9%) relative to other competing accelerator participants in the same generation (and controlling 
for observable differences across start-ups). We plot the corresponding estimated probability of 
schooling of the estimates in Column 1 (and the 90% confidence interval) in Figure 4; the 
discontinuity is evident. Table 4 shows the discontinuity estimate is robust to different specifications 
of Equation (3), including restricting the sample to start-ups scoring 1.5 points around the cutoff 
(Column 3), restricting the sample to those scoring 1.0 point around the cutoff (Column 4), and using 
a second-degree polynomial (Column 5).  
We deploy two main tests for manipulation of start-ups around the 3.6 pitch-day score. First, 
in Figure 5, we plot the density of competitors by average pitch-day score and show that no 
discontinuity exists around the 3.6 cutoff. More formally, we cannot reject the hypothesis of local 
continuity in the distribution of average pitch-day scores at the cutoff (the t-statistic from the McCrary 
test is -0.191). This finding is as expected; given its informality, the quality bar threshold is unknown 
by participants and judges, which further limits the scope for manipulation. Second, we estimate 
Equation (3) using predetermined covariates as the dependent variable to verify that the start-ups 
above and below the cutoff are comparable ex ante. Figure 6 shows evidence of a balanced sample. 
The only significant difference in covariates regards the indicator variable Capital raised before—
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participants who scored above 3.6 on the pitch-day are significantly more likely to have secured 
external financing prior to joining the accelerator. Further inspection reveals, however, that such 
capital arises from nonspecialized financiers such as family and friends; no difference is evident when 
restricting the type of capital to Specialized capital raised before (which includes angel, accelerator, 
or VC fundraising) as shown in the figure. We include the variable Capital raised before as a control 
in our regressions, and verify that the results are unchanged by its inclusion.  
We implement the fuzzy RDD by estimating the system of equations using (3) above and  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ?̆?(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) + 𝑍𝑠′𝜑 + 𝜖𝑠, (4) 
where the vector of controls varies across specifications and includes generation fixed effects and the 
covariate Specialized capital raised before. The system of equations identifies a local average 
treatment effect of entrepreneurship schooling under the assumption that no similar discontinuity 
exists in the unobservable quality of start-ups that scored close to 3.6 on the pitch-day. In Section 4.3, 
we conduct several tests for this assumption. Inference based on the fuzzy RDD is restricted to those 
observations whose treatment is randomized by the selection rule. 
3. Outcome Variables 
Collecting performance measures for all applicants to the accelerator is challenging. The vast majority 
of applicants are not registered in standard (local or foreign) business data sources. Moreover, the 
program did not collect performance data on nonparticipating applicants. Therefore, we use two 
strategies to address this challenge. First, similar to prior research (Kerr et al. 2014; Goldfarb et al. 
2007; Hallen et al. 2016), we hand-collected Web-based performance measures for all applicants. 
Second, we relied on two surveys: a post-application survey to all Applicants and a post-participation 
survey to all participants. All outcomes are measured within 4.75 years since potential entry to the 
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accelerator. Greater details about this data-collection strategy and the definitions of each outcome 
variable can be found in Appendix 3.  
For our Web-based measures, we searched through the Facebook and LinkedIn (CB Insights) 
platforms during the first quarter of 2014 (mid-2015). Because participating generations arrived from 
2011 through 2013, these metrics represent new venture performance outcomes between 0.75 and 
2.75 years (2 and 4 years) since potential entry into the program. Our first survey was sent to all 
Applicants on October 2014 (between 1.3 and 3.3 years since potential entry). The response rate was 
9%.15 During the first quarter of 2016, the accelerator conducted a second performance-outcome 
survey (between 2.75 and 4.75 years since entry), focusing only on Participants. The response rate 
was 72.4%. To distinguish between our three data sources, we identify the Web-based measures with 
the prefix “Web,” the applicant survey measures with “Survey A,” and the participant survey 
measures with “Survey P.” 
For each data source, we constructed five new venture performance proxies: Capital indicator 
as a binary variable for securing capital after potential participation in the accelerator; the natural 
logarithm of the value of Capital raised since inception, excluding the seed capital provided by the 
program to participants; the natural logarithm of the number of Employees; market Traction as the 
natural logarithm of the sales (or Facebook likes, in the case of the Web-based measure) during the 
six preceding months; and a binary variable to indicate Survival. In addition, we were able to 
construct Valuation as a sixth performance proxy from our survey data sources, which corresponds to 
                                                          
15 Because we received few responses from participants who competed for a spot in the entrepreneurship school 
(45), and even fewer from schooled participants (13), we only use this first survey to test basic accelerator 
services for Applicants. 
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the natural logarithm of the pre-money valuation of the start-up.16 We used logarithmic 
transformations of continuous outcome variables to mitigate the potential impact of outliers (see also 
Section 4.3). 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the five Web-based outcome measures. Within four 
years of potential entry into the program, the average applicant is 2.60% likely to secure specialized 
financing, raises 0.49 (log) dollars in capital, has 0.53 employees, has an average traction of 0.06 (log 
Facebook likes), and is 21.2% likely to survive. 
Table 1 also presents summary statistics of the survey-based performance metrics. Within 3.3 
years of potential entry into the program, the average applicant-survey respondent is 65.80% likely to 
secure external funding, raises 6.97 (log) dollars in capital, has 0.54 (log) employees, an average 
traction of 3.67, and is 61.80% likely to survive.17 Within 4.75 years of entry into the program, the 
average participant-survey respondent is 57.90% likely to secure funding, raises 7.12 (log) dollars in 
capital, has 1.33 (log) employees, an average traction of 6.82, and is 64.10% likely to survive.  
In Table 5, we report correlations across our Web-based and survey-based proxies for new 
venture performance. All (except 2 out of 10) Web-based and survey-based performance metrics have 
a positive and statistically significant correlation, albeit a small one. This low correlation is likely due 
to differences across both data-collection systems in the timing of the collection, potential response 
biases, and variable definitions. Our Applicants survey lags (precedes) our Web-based metrics by 0.7 
(0.7) years for Facebook and LinkedIn (CB Insights) data sources, whereas our participants survey 
                                                          
16 For those applicants that have not secured external funding, this variable corresponds to their perceived 
valuation. 
17 The average survival rate is lower than the fundraising rate because some of the companies that raised 
financing were not alive by the time of the survey, yet the founders answered the questionnaire. Results are 
robust to excluding these companies from the sample. 
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lags our Web-based metrics by 2 (0.8) years for Facebook and LinkedIn (CB Insights) data sources. 
These lags can lead to important measurement differences: Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Hurst and 
Pugsley (2011) document large heterogeneity in young (less than 2 years) firm growth, and de Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff (2014) document time heterogeneity across short- and long-term effects of 
business-training programs. Moreover, survey respondents may be systematically different from 
average program participants. For example, successful firms may be more (or less) likely to answer 
surveys. Indeed, survival rates in our survey-based samples appear particularly high relative to the 
average survival rates reported by Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Puri and Zarutskie (2012) from the 
universe of firms. Furthermore, survey- and Web-based metrics are defined differently. For example, 
survey respondents include capital from family in their reported fundraising, whereas CB Insights 
includes only specialized capital sources. Also, whereas survey respondents report the number of 
employees in their firms, Web-based measures report ranges (see Appendix 3 for additional details).  
4. Results 
4.1 The effect of basic accelerator services on new venture performance 
Table 6 summarizes the estimated effects of basic accelerator services on all outcome variables. 
Reported standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust. Columns 1 and 2 report ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) estimates comparing participants and nonparticipants, with and without controlling for 
covariates. Participants consistently outperform rejected applicants: results in Column 2 indicate 
participants are 5.6% more likely than nonparticipants to raise capital after the program.  
Columns 3–10 report estimates using the fuzzy RDD with different combinations of 
bandwidths (h) and polynomial degrees (p), following the same structure used in Table 3. In contrast 
to OLS estimates, RDD specifications result in nonsignificant coefficients across all outcome 
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variables, and generally smaller point estimates, which vary significantly across specifications in 
terms of both magnitude and sign. 
In an unreported analysis, we verify that results are the same if we allow polynomials to differ 
on either side of the threshold, excluding observations from generations 1 and 2 and participants in the 
entrepreneurship school. We also find no evidence of heterogeneity in the effect across several 
covariates such as gender, nationality, and age.  
Two interpretations are possible for the negative differences between the RDD and the OLS 
effects, because RDD estimates a local average treatment effect (cf. Lee and Lemieux 2010). Under 
the assumption of underlying heterogeneity in the treatment effect, these negative differences can 
reflect lower-than-average returns of basic services in the subpopulation that the selection rule 
randomizes into the program. Under the assumption that no such heterogeneity exists, the negative 
difference can also reflect the program’s ability to screen applicants.  
4.2 The effect of entrepreneurship schooling on new venture performance 
Table 7 reports the coefficients of each outcome variable regarding the estimated effect of 
participating in the entrepreneurship school. Column 1 (2) reports OLS estimates without (with) 
controls. Column 1 shows that schooled participants are 9.1% more likely to raise capital after the 
program. Column 2 shows fundraising ability prior to schooling does not explain the increase in 
fundraising performance—results continue to hold once we control for Capital raised before. 
Columns 3–7 report estimates using different specifications of the fuzzy RDD, with and 
without controlling for covariates, and using different combinations of bandwidths (h) and polynomial 
degrees (p), following the same structure used in Table 4. Evidence suggests positive and large causal 
effects of the entrepreneurship school. The first rows of Column (3) show that schooling increases the 
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probability of fundraising by 21.0%, the amount of capital raised by a factor of three, market traction 
by 23.8%, the number of employees by a factor of two, and valuations by a factor of five. Scale 
effects partly explain the large magnitudes. For example, a twofold increase in employees roughly 
means that firms hire one more employee (from an unconditional average of 0.9 to 1.8). Similarly, a 
threefold increase in capital raised means firms increase fundraising from an unconditional average of 
37,000 USD to 112,000 USD. Controlling for observable covariates (Column 4) only marginally 
affects the statistical significance, and, importantly, does not affect the magnitude of the estimated 
treatment effect.  
Table 8 shows that the economic magnitude of the entrepreneurship schooling effect is similar 
across different proxies of a given outcome. For example, Column 3 shows that entrepreneurship 
schooling increases the likelihood of fundraising by 0.29 and 0.39 standard deviations, respectively, 
according to the Web-based metric (Web Capital Indicator) and survey-based metric (Survey P. 
Capital Indicator). Similarly, the same column shows that, based on Web-based (survey-based) 
metrics, entrepreneurship schooling increases the amount of capital raised by 0.30 (0.43) standard 
deviations, market traction by 0.31 (0.30) standard deviations, and employees by 0.34 (0.28) standard 
deviations. Table 8 reports normalized coefficient estimates following the same structure used in 
Table 7.  
The results in Columns 5–7 in Table 7 show that the findings are also qualitatively robust to 
using different bandwidths and polynomials in the RDD estimation (following the same structure as 
Table 4). They also continue to hold when we restrict the sample to the last two generations (for 
which data collection may be more accurate), and are stronger for companies in industries that require 
a Web presence, such as e-commerce, media, mobile, social media, and social networks. This finding 
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is consistent with the notion that start-ups from the “new economy” grow faster than those from 
traditional industries, enabling us to observe performance differences earlier on. 
Finally, we find no evidence that the entrepreneurship school affects new venture survival (as 
measured by Web- or survey-based metrics), and the implied economic magnitude of the point 
estimates (Column 3, Table 8) is very small. Consistent with arguments by Maurer and Ebers (2006), 
this finding may reflect the notion that start-ups can survive through the persistence of their founders, 
but fundraising and growth are more likely to rely on entrepreneurial capital.  
The positive difference between the OLS and RDD estimates (Table 7, Columns 2 and 3, 
respectively), suggests the RDD recovers the treatment effect for a subpopulation of start-ups with 
relatively high returns to entrepreneurship schooling. Such positive difference is a common result in 
the education literature, particularly in papers that exploit supply-side innovations for identification 
(such as selection processes based on qualification scores). In these papers, the instrumental variables 
estimates of the return to schooling typically exceed the corresponding OLS estimates, often by 20% 
or more (Card 2001). The leading explanation proposed for this pattern is that supply-side innovations 
are most likely to affect the schooling choices of individuals who would otherwise have relatively low 
schooling because they face higher than average access costs. In that case, the “local average 
treatment effect” (Imbens and Angrist 1994) reasoning suggests the instrumental variable estimator 
would yield estimated returns to schooling above the average marginal return to schooling in the 
population, and potentially above the corresponding OLS estimates. This explanation is also likely to 
hold in our setting. Start-ups that score close to the qualification threshold (“close calls”) are less 
likely to secure schooling elsewhere relative to start-ups that, during the pitch-day, are deemed to 
have more potential, partly because they have more entrepreneurial capital to begin with and are thus 
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scored highly by judges (“high scorers”). Hence, whereas high scorers may only marginally benefit 
from schooling, close calls are likely to benefit substantially, as lack of entrepreneurial capital can 
explain their worse performance during the pitch-day.  
An alternative explanation for the positive difference, which is less likely to resonate in our 
setting, is based on the additional assumption that the treatment effect of schooling is homogeneous; 
that is, that high scorers and close calls benefit equally from schooling. Under this assumption, the 
positive difference between the RDD and the OLS estimates would suggest that the selection process 
for the entrepreneurship school picks lower-potential rather than higher-potential start-ups, and thus 
that the OLS is biased downward rather than upward. This alternative interpretation is unlikely to hold 
in our setting for two reasons. First, the assumption that treatment effects of entrepreneurship 
schooling are homogenous across start-ups is not realistic. Not only has the education literature shown 
evidence of heterogeneous effects from schooling (cf. Card 2001), prior work on accelerators has 
emphasized how the treatment effect of these programs is likely to be heterogeneous. In particular, 
accelerators appear to be associated with both the accelerated success of good start-ups and the 
accelerated failure of bad ones (Yu 2016; Smith and Hannigan 2015). Second, while a criterion to 
select contestants based on their need for an “entrepreneurial capital subsidy” may be reasonable in 
certain situations, this criterion is not used in Start-Up Chile. Indeed, the Start-Up Chile selection 
process is based on a pitch competition, where judges are required to select the apparent highest 
performers, and no directives exist that guide staff to pick the weaker start-ups.  
4.3 Additional robustness tests  
In this section, we use complementary tests to provide suggestive evidence against six potential 
methodological concerns including identification issues, influential observations, potential 
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demotivation effects on pitch competition losers, multiple types of survey- and Web-reporting biases, 
and potential schooling effects on reporting (rather than on real outcomes). 
One first concern is that the RDD estimate is a consequence of the selection process and not 
of schooling; that is, that the pitch-day score, not the entrepreneurship school, explains the superior 
performance of schooled ventures. Against this concern, the results in Figures 5 and 6 show little 
evidence of a discontinuity in the scores or in the covariates at the 3.6 threshold. Instead, we would 
expect to see a jump in sample characteristics if breaks in observable venture quality explained the 
results. Three additional tests provide further supportive evidence against this concern. First, 
Appendix Figure 4.1 shows that the dispersion of pitch-day scores across judges looks similar for 
ventures closely above and below the threshold. If a break in unobservable characteristics explained 
the RDD estimates, we would instead expect less dispersion of pitch-day scores (i.e., less 
disagreement among judges) immediately above the threshold. Second, Appendix Table 4.1 shows 
that pitch-day scores are generally uninformative about performance. In regressions projecting 
outcomes onto pitch-day scores, pitch-day scores are never significant once we control for 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒. By 
contrast, if the selection process was driving the RDD estimates, we would expect the score to be 
informative about outcomes. The lack of pitch-day score predictability is not surprising; identifying 
high-quality start-ups is no easy task, even for expert investors who spend much more time and effort 
on due diligence than the judging time in the pitch competition (e.g., Kerr, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf 
2014). Finally, Appendix Table 4.1 shows that 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 only predicts performance among schooled 
entrepreneurs. If pitch-day scores fully explained the RDD estimates, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 should also predict the 
performance for nonschooled entrepreneurs. Together, these additional results suggest systematic 
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quality differences between firms closely above and below the 3.6 pitch-day threshold are unlikely to 
drive RDD results.  
A second potential concern is that influential observations drive our results, as outliers 
typically explain aggregate performance in early-stage financiers. To test whether such potential 
outliers drive our results, we ran multiple “leave-one-out” regressions that exclude observations from 
the estimation one by one. We classify observations as influential if their removal changes the 
significance of our results; that is, if the p value of the estimate falls below 10%. Appendix Table 4.2 
confirms that outliers are not the main explanation for the estimated effects and that no influential 
observations exist for four out of six of the main results in Table 7. For the remaining two results 
(Web Capital Indicator and Web Employees), the removal of influential observations only slightly 
changes the significance (from 0.074 to 0.115, and 0.095 to 0.160), and does not dramatically change 
the point estimate. 
A third potential concern is that the failure to enter the entrepreneurship school may 
demotivate pitch-day competition losers, inducing a relative increase in the performance of schooled 
participants. Against this possibility, Table 7 shows that schooling has no effect on venture survival. 
This finding implies that if any demotivation was taking place, it would not be enough to fully 
discourage entrepreneurs from pushing their ventures further.18 Appendix Table 4.3 presents further 
supportive evidence against this concern. We restrict the sample to losers and project venture 
outcomes based on pitch-day scores, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒, and the fraction of pitch-day winners that are in the same 
reference group as the start-up. Panel A (B) uses the ventures in the same industry (and location) of 
                                                          
18 Because our sample is not comprised of subsistence entrepreneurs, common sense suggests that if 
entrepreneurs were not motivated, they would simply stop pursuing their ventures. 
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the start-up as a reference group. The table shows that the performance of losers does not correlate 
with the fraction of winners. If demotivation were the main explanation behind the findings, we would 
expect a negative relation between these two variables. If most similar start-ups are rejected, then the 
start-up is likely to blame the industry for the loss rather than its own individual performance. Finally, 
Appendix Figure 4.2 shows no decreasing pattern in performance across pitch-day scores below 3.6. 
If demotivation were the main explanation behind the effect, we would expect a dip in survival and 
performance to the left of the threshold.  
A fourth potential concern is that schooling increases the probability of Web and survey 
reporting, which could potentially bias the RDD estimates (e.g., Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2014). 
Against this possibility, the survey response rate is the same across schooled and nonschooled 
ventures (the estimated difference is 0.09 and the t-statistic is 1.18). In addition, although Start-Up 
Chile encourages the use of AngelList for communication purposes program-wide, the 
entrepreneurship school gives no additional nudge to open a profile on this site. Consistent with this 
notion, schooled and nonschooled participants were equally likely to have an AngelList profile in 
December 2013 (the estimated difference is 0.01; the t-statistic is 0.10). We refined this test using 
information from Google Insights, for which we timed Web activity (we downloaded information on 
Web activity per semester based on company name). We found that schooled and nonschooled 
participants have a similar Web presence immediately after their potential participation in the program 
(with a difference of 4.59 and a t-statistic of 0.80). 
A related concern is that schooled ventures may over-report performance in surveys, which 
would positively bias RDD estimates. For example, schooled ventures may want to exaggerate how 
well their firms benefited from the program. This concern is mitigated by results using Web sources, 
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where entrepreneurs have both less control over what is reported and the potential for misreporting to 
be heavily punished. Although participants have the freedom to choose whether to open up profiles on 
social media platforms (e.g., Facebook), industry providers, such as CB Insights, sweep all Web sites 
collecting nonself-reported news about start-ups, which founders are less likely to be able to fully 
manipulate. Reputational considerations also likely mitigate rampant lying; misreporting fundraising 
can seriously affect start-ups’ chances of securing fundraising in the future. Relatedly, RDD estimates 
of survey-based metrics may also be positively biased if better applicants are more likely to answer 
surveys and judges’ scores reflect quality. This concern is mitigated by the little information content 
provided by pitch-day scores; whereas the best companies may be more likely to answer surveys, 
evidence suggests that judges do not appear to consistently assign them scores above 3.6 (see 
Appendix Table 4.1). 
Finally, RDD estimates may also be positively biased if schooling induces better record 
keeping, even if outcomes remain largely unchanged. We test for this potential source of bias by 
examining survey-reporting errors and their association with schooling (cf. Drexler et al. 2014; Berge, 
Bjorvatn, and Tungodden 2015; de Mel et al. 2014). We find that the propensity to err is not 
statistically different across schooled and nonschooled participants (estimated difference is 0.02 and t-
statistic is -0.99).19  
5. Discussion 
Our findings show evidence that entrepreneurship schooling, bundled with the basic services of cash 
and coworking space, appears to lead to significantly higher new venture performance within the first 
                                                          
19 We record as errors all instances in which start-ups report (1) higher sales during the previous year than since 
they began operations, (2) higher sales in Chile than overall sales, (3) higher capital fundraising in Chile than 
overall, and (4) more employees in Chile than overall. 
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4.75 years since entry to the accelerator. By contrast, basic services alone do not appear to have an 
effect on new venture performance. This is the first paper to provide this type of evidence for business 
accelerators, which have emerged as a new institutional form to support early stage start-ups. While 
nascent academic research has begun exploring this growing institutional form, very little rigorous 
evidence exists on the effect of business accelerators on new venture performance, and on 
distinguishing which of the services provided by these programs add value. 
The pattern of results suggests that entrepreneurial capital is a key factor for new venture 
performance. This pattern is also consistent with the well-established findings on how interventions 
that combine finance (especially grants) and business training are more effective in supporting 
subsistence businesses than finance alone (e.g., Bandiera et al. 2013).  
Moreover, the implied magnitude of the findings is also similar to prior papers on business 
training interventions. For example, Calderon, Cunha, and de Giorgi (2013) and de Mel et al. (2014) 
find a 20% and 41% increase in sales (within 12 and 8 months). These results are similar to our 
estimate of a 23.8% increase in Web-based venture traction (and are within the confidence interval of 
our survey-based results; see Column 3 in Table 7). Our estimates on employees are close to those of 
Glaub et al. (2012), who estimate that treated firms have roughly twice as many workers as control 
firms after five to seven months of a three-day training intervention. This estimate is within the 
standard error bands of both our estimates on employment reported in Column 3 of Table 7 (198.5% 
and 87.1%, Web-based and survey-based, respectively). Finally, similar to our own noisy estimates 
for survival, most studies also find positive but insignificant impacts (cf. McKenzie and Woodruff 
2013).  
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In the rest of this section, we discuss three final points: the external validity of the results; the 
potential reasons why basic services alone have no apparent impact in our setting; and the potential 
mechanisms through which entrepreneurship schooling bundled with basic services can affect new 
venture performance. We also address the potential frictions preventing entrepreneurs from acquiring 
these services elsewhere. Although our setting does not allow us to pinpoint the exact mechanisms 
underlying entrepreneurship schooling, our discussion, grounded in the education literature, sheds 
light on future research avenues.  
5.1 External validity  
Two issues can affect the external validity of results. The first is that our estimates correspond to local 
average treatment effects around qualification cutoffs, and the subpopulations of start-ups around 
those cutoffs may not necessarily be representative of average start-ups in the population. For 
example, these start-ups may be particularly sensitive to schooling services, which may explain the 
large magnitudes of our estimates. However, the local nature of the estimates does not necessarily 
decimate their external validity (cf. Card 2001). From a practical standpoint, our local estimates are 
particularly useful to policy makers. After all, policy interventions of entrepreneurship schooling are 
best suited to target subpopulations that are particularly lacking in entrepreneurial capital.  
The second potential issue is that Start-Up Chile is a unique program, and thus results from 
this setting may not generalize to other ecosystem accelerators. However, Start-Up Chile is actually 
very similar to the average ecosystem accelerator.  
For example, reallocation requirements for participants and the location of the program 
(typically an underdeveloped economic hub) are common traits. Indeed, we estimate that 58.6% of 
ecosystem accelerators worldwide require full founding team relocation, and an additional 31.0% 
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have at least some partial relocation requirement.20 Moreover, 37.9% of ecosystem accelerators are 
located in underdeveloped regions (17.9% Africa, 10.3% Latin America, 10.3% India); 37.9% are in 
the United States, but outside Silicon Valley; and the rest are in Europe, the United Kingdom, or 
Canada, but not typically in the capital cities of these countries. In addition, concerns regarding the 
ability of average ecosystem accelerators to replicate the visibility increase provided by Start-Up 
Chile do not appear first order. We estimate that news sponsors cover 76% of ecosystem accelerators 
(i.e., have at least one article in their press clips or the program futures in TechCrunch’s CrunchBase 
database). Also, the vast majority of accelerators publish the names of their participants on their Web 
pages (in fact, this practice is common across early-stage financial intermediaries), and finalize the 
program with a well-publicized demo day (Cohen and Hochberg 2014). 
Finally, the guidance and accountability and networking opportunities provided by the 
entrepreneurship schooling at Start-Up Chile are prevalent among ecosystem accelerators, and among 
investor-led and corporate business accelerators more generally. In surveys on business accelerators, 
network development as well as guidance and accountability appear extensive, although quite 
heterogeneous across programs. Cohen and Hochberg (2014) argue that accelerator programs 
generally include seminars given by staff or guest speakers who often provide one-on-one guidance 
after the talk. Some programs also schedule meetings with several mentors; others may make 
introductions on an as-needed basis, or simply hand entrepreneurs a list of preselected mentors. A 
recent report by Nesta and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2017) on 
accelerators in the United Kingdom documents a great deal of variation in the way that the 
                                                          
20 We use hand-collected descriptions of ecosystem accelerators surveyed by the Entrepreneurship Database 
Program at Goizueta Business School of Emory University on ecosystem accelerators worldwide to construct 
these estimates.  
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entrepreneurship schooling services are imparted. In particular, of surveyed accelerators, 85% offer 
some form of mentoring; 45% offer seminars or workshops; and 12%, 11%, and 6% offer more 
specific help in the form of access to experts, legal/accountancy support, and technology support, 
respectively.  
Regardless of the similarities between Start-Up Chile and other ecosystem accelerators, we 
are, however, careful to emphasize the differences between average applicants to Start-Up Chile and 
other ecosystem accelerators worldwide, as mentioned in Section 1.3. We argue that the external 
validity of our findings is likely confined to other ecosystem accelerators that focus on young 
founders and early-stage start-ups. 
5.2 Why did basic services of cash and coworking space have no apparent impact on new 
venture performance?  
Other than the null hypothesis being true, one potential explanation is that start-ups near the capacity 
threshold are heterogeneous in their potential for success, and that basic services accelerate the 
inevitable outcomes (growth or failure) of participants relative to nonparticipants. In this case, the 
program might accelerate the success of high-potential business opportunities and expedite the demise 
of low-potential ones, with a resulting zero average treatment effect. For example, cash infusions can 
help founders discover fundamental flaws in their prototypes that justify the termination of the start-
up or help them access new information that justifies the creation of a different start-up (Yu 2016; 
Smith and Hannigan 2015; Leatherbee and Katila 2017).  
Other potential explanations are less consistent with the results. One first alternative is that we 
do not have enough power to reject the null. That is, that the effect is indeed positive, but we do not 
have a big enough sample to distinguish it from zero. Against the notion that this possibility is a first 
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order explanation, Table 6 shows that estimated effects are often negative, sometimes close to zero, 
and switch signs across specifications. In addition, Appendix Table 4.4 summarizes back-of-the-
envelope power calculations that suggest we have enough power in the majority of specifications.  
A second potential explanation is that the capital infusion is too small (not critical enough) to 
generate positive returns. While this explanation cannot be completely ruled out, it is not as likely to 
resonate in our setting for three main reasons. First, applicant start-ups are predominantly from the 
“new economy,” for which the necessary levels of physical capital stock to generate positive returns 
are generally low (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2000). Second, start-ups in our sample are mostly in the 
business model discovery and validation phase, which is typically characterized by low levels of fixed 
costs. Third, the program estimates that relocation costs only represent 10% of the grant. In addition, 
the cash provided by Start-Up Chile is actually above the average stipend of $22,890 provided in 
business accelerators, as reported in Cohen and Hochberg (2014). 
A third potential explanation is that rejected applicants secured acceleration services 
elsewhere, thereby dampening the estimated effect of the basic services. The analysis of 
supplementary data does not support this alternative story. We collected information from Seed-DB21 
regarding nonparticipants’ acceptance into other programs, and found that only 2% of rejected 
applicants secured financing in other accelerators. This low probability is consistent with recent 
estimates of low acceptance rates in accelerators worldwide. According to FS6.com, a Web platform 
that runs 90% of applications to accelerators globally, less than 3.98% of applicants ever make it into 
an accelerator (Butcher 2014). 
                                                          
21 Seed-DB is an open-source accelerator database built on CrunchBase data (http://www.seed-deb.com/). 
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One last potential explanation is that the mechanisms to curb entrepreneurs’ opportunistic 
behavior22 are not strong enough through the program’s basic services. Indeed, the value-adding 
monitoring and powerful allocation of control rights by financial intermediaries (Hellman 1998; 
Cornelli and Yosha 2003) are most pronounced in the entrepreneurship school. According to the 
program’s staff, however, even nonschooled participants are very motivated. Since the inception of 
the program, only one case of questionable use of funds has occurred, and corrective measures were 
taken. The lack of opportunistic behavior may be a due to reputational consequences acting as 
disciplinary devices (cf. Bernthal 2015).  
5.3 How does entrepreneurship schooling affect performance? 
While our setting is not suited to distinguish the specific mechanisms by which entrepreneurship 
schooling can affect performance, our results provide an empirical foothold for future research to 
explore how specifically schooling matters.  
Based on the education literature, and consistent with interviews and surveys to participants, 
we distinguish two broad potential mechanisms (see Appendix 1): productivity increases (Becker 
1975) and certification (Spence 1973; Arrow 1973). Productivity may increase via the instruction of 
entrepreneurship know-how from peers and staff (cf. Lerner and Malmendier 2013), access to 
valuable social networks (Granovetter 1973; Ketchen, Ireland, and Snow 2007; Cai and Szeidl 2016), 
the structured accountability imposed by regular meetings (cf. Locke and Latham 2002; Cialdini and 
Goldstein 2004), and increases in the self-efficacy of founders (Bandura 1982; Forbes 2005; Heckman 
and Kautz 2013). In the absence of business accelerators, start-ups may not realize these productivity 
                                                          
22 The program takes no equity stake in participating start-ups. However, it engages in capital staging, and 
reputational consequences of opportunistic behavior are likely. 
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increases because of market frictions, such as informational constraints. For example, accelerators 
may provide entrepreneurial know-how through experiential learning, which is a type of learning not 
typically found in traditional educational programs. Business school syllabi rarely provide such 
learning opportunities, as often professors lack the necessary hands-on business experience. Indeed, it 
is only until recently that universities have begun to replicate the business accelerator model in their 
educational programs. In addition, business accelerators may help overconfident entrepreneurs to 
recognize the value of accountability structures for performance, which they would not otherwise 
demand. Furthermore, some founders may simply be unaware of the importance of building business 
networks and not look for networking opportunities outside the accelerator.  
Certification may also be at play because business accelerators typically increase the exposure 
and legitimacy of ventures (Zott and Huy 2007) via, for example, the promotion of start-ups on 
accelerators’ Web sites and during the demo days at the end of the programs (Cohen and Hochberg 
2014). Start-ups may need certification because of information asymmetries relative to the potential 
performance, which are typically prevalent in transformational ventures.  
Future research may extend exploration of the effects of entrepreneurship schooling to the 
founder-level of analysis. Understanding how accelerators influence the persistence of individuals on 
an entrepreneurial career path and how an entrepreneurial experience may influence an individual’s 
entrepreneurial capital for the creation of economic value regardless of her career path are two other 
important questions future research can seek to answer. 
6. Conclusions  
Whether accelerators affect new venture performance is an important question with both theoretical 
and practical implications. However, until now little rigorous evidence has existed about whether 
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accelerators are effective, and, if so, which services make them so. This paper provides the first quasi-
experimental evidence of the effect of accelerator programs and the importance of entrepreneurial 
capital on new venture performance, shedding light on entrepreneurship schooling as a topic that is 
ripe for future research. 
We evaluated an ecosystem accelerator that provides participants with seed capital and 
coworking space. The accelerator also provides entrepreneurship-schooling services to a 
competitively select few. We find entrepreneurship schooling bundled with the basic services of cash 
and coworking space leads to significant increases in venture fundraising and scale. By contrast, we 
find no evidence that the basic accelerator services alone improve new venture performance.  
Regarding the policy design of ecosystem accelerator programs, if the objective is to 
accelerate start-ups, our results suggest that more resources should be allocated toward combining 
basic services with entrepreneurship schooling, rather than providing basic services on their own. This 
conclusion is particularly valid for programs that focus on young founders and early-stage start-ups.  
The findings are consistent with the view that entrepreneurial capital, similar to managerial 
capital, is a type of capital that is missing among certain populations (cf. Bruhn et al. 2010). Avenues 
for future research can include distinguishing the mechanisms through which entrepreneurship 
schooling and basic services in business accelerators affect entrepreneurial capital, including potential 
productivity increases and certification effects.   
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Figure 1. Fraction of accelerated applicants  
The figure shows the average fraction of accelerated applicants (dots) in bins of 10 applicants, as well as the fitted 
values and 90% confidence interval from the regression 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝛿 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 −
𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑔) + 𝑋𝑠′𝜎 + 𝜀𝑠, where the outcome variable Acceleration is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
applicant participated in the accelerator, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟, a variable that equals 1 if the applicant ranks above the ranking 
cutoff of the capacity threshold in its generation, and 0 otherwise, and 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) is a fourth-degree 
polynomial of the normalized rank. The vertical line represents the ranking cutoff normalized at 0 for the 
normalized rank. Only observations ranking below 301 are included in the plot. The relatively poor fit of the 
polynomial for companies ranking around 150 (+50 in the plot) is not mechanically driven by the change in 
capacity threshold in generation 2: the estimated participation rate for companies ranking in positions 150, 155, 
and 159 is lower than the observed probability of 0.6 across generations 3 to 8. In unreported analysis, we checked 
whether the participants ranking in these positions are observationally different (they are not) and whether a 
discontinuity exists here (it doesn’t). Alternative explanations for the poor fit include a statistical issue (i.e., we 
have information about only 7 generations, and in this sample, start-ups ranking around 150 happen to be of 
comparatively good quality) and checking thresholds by program officials (i.e., start-ups around 150 and 160 





































Figure 2. Density of judges’ application scores  
The figure presents a finely gridded histogram of the normalized application scores. For each applicant, the score 
of the capacity-threshold-ranking company (of its generation) is subtracted from the application score. Judges 
score applications from 1 to 10. Average scores range in practice from 1.28 to 8.9. The null hypothesis of no 
discontinuity in the distribution of the normalized application scores at the threshold cannot be rejected: the t-
statistic from the McCrary test is -0.267 (log difference in height is -0.026 with standard error of 0.96). The 
McCrary test uses a local linear regression of the histogram separately on either side of the threshold to 










    
   
  
Figure 3. Balanced sample around the application capacity threshold 
The figure shows evidence of a balanced sample near the capacity-threshold-ranking cutoff. Chilean (Female) is 
a dummy that equals 1 if the founder is Chilean (Female); Employees before is the number of workers the start-
up reported at the time of application (censored at 10); Capital raised before is a dummy that equals 1 if the start-
up fundraised before potential participation in the program; Prototype equals 1 if the start-up has a working 
prototype/or has one in development; and Young equals 1 if the start-up is less than a year old. All variables are 
as of the application date. The plots show averages grouped in bins of 10 applicants (dots), and the fitted values 
and 90% confidence interval from the regression 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝛿 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) + 𝑋𝑠′Μ +
𝜀𝑠, with each of these variables as outcomes, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟, a variable that equals 1 if the applicant ranks above the 
ranking cutoff of the capacity threshold in its generation, and 0 otherwise, and 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) is a fourth-































































Figure 4. Fraction of schooled participants 
The figure shows the average fraction of schooled participants in bins of 0.2 pitch-day scores, and the fitted values 
and 90% confidence interval from the regression 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 = 𝜏 + 𝜇𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 + 𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) + 𝜀𝑠, 
where the outcome variable School is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant was schooled; 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant scored above 3.6 on the pitch day; and 
𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) is a first-degree polynomial of the pitch-day score. The vertical line represents the 





























Figure 5. Density of pitch-day scores 
The figure presents a finely gridded histogram of the pitch-day scores for all participants looking to qualify for 
the entrepreneurship school. Judges score applications from 0 to 5. In practice, average scores range from 0 to 
4.45. The null hypothesis of no discontinuity in the distribution of the normalized application scores at the 
threshold cannot be rejected: the t-statistic from the McCrary test is -0.191. The McCrary test uses a local linear 
regression of the histogram separately on either side of the threshold to accommodate the discontinuity. For 
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Figure 6. Balanced sample around the 3.6 pitch-day-score cutoff 
The figure shows evidence of a balanced sample near the pitch-day cutoff for pitch-day competitors. Chilean 





















































0 1 2 3 4 5
Pitch-Day Score











the start-up reported at the time of application (censored at 10), Capital raised before is a dummy that equals 1 if 
the start-up fundraised before potential participation in the program; Prototype equals 1 if the start-up has a 
working prototype/or has one in development; and Young equals 1 if the start-up is less than a year old. All 
variables are as of the application date. Plots show averages grouped in bins of 0.2 in pitch-day score. The plots 
also show the fitted values and 90% confidence interval of a modified version of the regression in Equation (2), 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝜎 + 𝜔𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 + ?̌?(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 3.6) + 𝜖, with each of these variables as outcomes, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant scored above 3.6 on the pitch day, and 
?̌?(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 3.6) is a first-degree polynomial of the pitch-day score. The vertical line represents the 
informal pitch-day-score cutoff of 3.6. 
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The table presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. The first and second sections 
include variables extracted from the applications and the Start-Up Chile records. The third section includes Web-
based outcome variables, which were collected during first quarter of 2014 (mid-2015) from Facebook and 
LinkedIn (CB Insights). The last two sections include survey-based outcome variables. The first survey was 
distributed to all applicants during October 2014, and the second survey was distributed to all participants during 
the first quarter of 2016. For variable definitions, see Sections 1.3 and 3.  
 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.  
Application form       
Age  1,582 30.33 6.76 19.00 84.00  
Chilean 3,258 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00  
Female 1,906 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00  
Employees before 2,248 2.46 1.46 1.00 10.00  
Capital raised before 2,779 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00  
Prototype 3,258 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00  
Selection process       
Rank 3,258 260.91 164.33 1.00 656  
Pitch-day score 276 3.14 0.70 0.00 4.50  
Acceleration 3,258 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00  
School 3,258 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00  
Web-based outcomes       
Web capital indicator  3,258 0.026 0.159 0.00 1.00  
Web capital raised 3,258 0.491 2.336 0.00 16.93  
Web employees 3,258 0.534 1.939 0.00 11.00  
Web traction 3,258 0.063 0.284 0.00 4.78  
Web survival 3,258 0.212 0.409 0.00 1.00  
Survey applicants outcomes       
Survey A. capital indicator 319 0.658 0.475 0.00 1.00  
Survey A. capital raised 318 6.973 5.246 0.00 14.51  
Survey A. valuation 318 7.664 6.512 0.00 16.52  
Survey A. employees 319 0.542 0.799 0.00 3.43  
Survey A. traction 319 3.673 4.610 0.00 13.12  
Survey A. survival 319 0.618 0.487 0.00 1.00  
Survey participants outcomes       
Survey P. capital indicator 145 0.579 0.495 0.00 1.00  
Survey P. capital raised 145 7.118 6.262 0.00 18.60  
Survey P. valuation 145 4.673 6.957 0.00 19.56  
Survey P. employees 145 1.333 1.255 0.00 4.812  
Survey P. traction 145 6.823 6.142 0.00 16.81  
Survey P. survival 145 0.641 0.481 0.00 1.00  
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A  B 
Pitch-day 
score bracket 




Generation    
All 
Generation  
4 5 6 7   4 5 6 7 
0.0–0.9 1.4 4 0 4 0 0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.0–1.5 0.4 1 0 1 0 0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.6–2.0 4.7 13 3 6 1 3  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2.1–2.5 9.1 25 3 12 6 4  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2.6–3.0 30.1 83 10 35 16 22  9.6 0.0 8.6 0.0 22.7 
3.1–3.5 27.9 77 25 11 33 8  7.8 0.0 36.4 0.0 25.0 
3.6–4.0 19.6 54 16 8 22 8   53.7 50.0 75.0 40.9 75.0 
4.1–4.5 6.9 19 5 3 11 0  84.2 100.0 66.7 81.8 0.0 
4.6–5.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 





Table 3. Discontinuity probability of acceleration at the capacity threshold 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 p=1 & h=50 p=1, controls & h=50 p=2  p=2 & controls p=3  p=3 & controls p=4 p=4 & controls 
Higher 0.303*** 0.319*** 0.207*** 0.191*** 0.176*** 0.200*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 
 (0.071) (0.083) (0.035) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048) (0.041) (0.049) 
Obs. 682 499 3,258 1,906 3,258 1,906 3,258 1,906 
R-squared 0.070 0.128 0.397 0.447 0.398 0.447 0.399 0.451 
 
This table shows the discontinuity in the probability of acceleration around the capacity-threshold-ranking cutoff. Columns (1)–(8) report the coefficient of 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 (𝛾) of the 
regression: 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛿 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓) + 𝑋′𝜎 + 𝜀. The variable 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 equals 1 if the applicant participated in the accelerator; the variable 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 equals 1 if the applicant ranks higher than the capacity threshold in its generation, and 0 otherwise; and 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓) is a pth-degree polynomial of the modified 
rank (i.e., 𝑧 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓). The type of specification is indicated at the top of each column, that is, inclusion of controls, the degree of the polynomial used (p), and the 
bandwidth (h), specified in terms of ranks included around the threshold. If no bandwidth is specified, then the full sample was used. The controls included are Chilean, Female, 
Capital raised before, Prototype, Young, and generation fixed effects. To conserve space, the estimated coefficients for the polynomial terms are not presented in the table. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4. Discontinuity probability of schooling at the pitch-day score of 3.6 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 p=1 p=1 & controls p=1& controls 
 & h=1.5 
p=1 & h=1 p=2 & controls 
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒  0.519*** 0.509*** 0.420*** 0.440*** 0.341*** 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.085) (0.094) (0.097) 
Observations 276 276 265 248 276 
R-squared 0.398 0.435 0.440 0.385 0.455 
This table shows the discontinuity in the probability of schooling around the pitch-day-score cutoff. Estimates are 
based on different specifications of the regression 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 = 𝜏 + 𝜇𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 + 𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 3.6) + 𝑍′𝜙 +
𝜀, where the outcome variable school is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant was selected into the 
entrepreneurship school, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant scored 3.6 or higher during 
the pitch day, and 𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 3.6) is a pth-degree polynomial of the normalized pitch-day score (i.e., 
pitch-day score minus the 3.6 cutoff). The type of specification is indicated at the top of each column including 
the degree of the polynomial used (p), and the inclusion of controls. Columns (3) and (4) include different 
bandwidth specifications (h) for pitch-day-score ranges of 2.1–5.0 (h=1.5) and 2.6–4.5 (h=1), respectively. The 
controls included are Capital raised before and generation fixed effects. To conserve space, the estimated 
coefficients for the constant and the polynomial terms are not presented in the table. Robust standard errors are 







Table 5. Correlation Web-based and survey-based performance proxies 
 
A. Correlation of fundraising proxies 
 Survey A.  
capital indicator 
Survey P.  
capital indicator 
Survey A.  
capital raised 
Survey P.  
capital raised 
Web capital indicator  0.04 0.17**   
 (0.53) (0.05)   
Web capital raised   0.11** 0.34*** 
   (0.05) (0.00) 
Observations 319 145 319 145 
 
B. Correlation of scale proxies 
 Survey A.  
employees 
Survey P.  
employees 
Survey A.  
traction 
Survey P.  
traction 
Web employees  0.13** 0.23***   
 (0.02) (0.01)   
Web traction   0.10* 0.20*** 
   (0.07) (0.00) 
Observations 319 145 319 145 
 
C. Correlation of survival proxies 
 
 Survey A.  
survival 
Survey P.  
survival 
Web survival  0.21*** -0.02 
 (0.00) (0.80) 
Observations 319 145 
 
The table presents correlations across Web-based and survey-based venture performance metrics. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Venture performance and basic acceleration services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 




p=1, controls & 
h=50 
p=2  p=2 & 
controls 
p=3  p=3 & 
controls 
p=4 p=4 & 
controls 
Web capital indicator 0.062*** 0.056*** -0.005 -0.047 0.037 0.062 0.065 0.088 0.049 0.056 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.089) (0.119) (0.071) (0.110) (0.098) (0.116) (0.103) (0.142) 
Web capital raised 1.215*** 1.019*** 0.956 0.355 0.439 0.106 0.160 0.056 0.117 0.108 
 (0.159) (0.168) (1.244) (1.501) (0.999) (1.454) (1.443) (1.558) (1.497) (1.876) 
Web traction 0.079*** 0.044** -0.235 -0.405* 0.021 0.006 -0.053 -0.089 -0.039 -0.108 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.184) (0.229) (0.125) (0.190) (0.206) (0.217) (0.203) (0.244) 
Web employees 0.655*** 0.315** -1.704 -2.615 -0.674 -1.514 -1.255 -1.974 -1.385 -2.880 
 (0.112) (0.131) (1.301) (1.709) (0.911) (1.462) (1.275) (1.506) (1.375) (2.050) 
Web survival 0.305*** 0.250*** -0.037 -0.136 0.199 0.284 0.282 0.314 0.272 0.426 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.233) (0.265) (0.165) (0.218) (0.225) (0.223) (0.238) (0.284) 
Survey A. capital indicator 0.163*** 0.181*** -0.352 -1.048 -0.456 -1.392 -0.328 -0.925 -0.593 -1.607 
 (0.054) (0.067) (0.342) (0.818) (0.701) (1.764) (0.571) (1.010) (0.762) (2.118) 
Survey A. capital raised 2.477*** 2.829*** -4.067 -11.296 -5.207 -14.214 -4.273 -10.467 -6.460 -16.954 
 (0.601) (0.753) (3.845) (8.811) (7.919) (19.055) (6.598) (11.675) (8.566) (23.435) 
Survey A. valuation 1.068 2.058** 1.091 -2.250 -0.682 0.055 1.110 -0.776 1.672 -6.340 
 (0.791) (0.990) (4.211) (7.765) (8.648) (13.988) (7.315) (10.354) (8.809) (17.965) 
Survey A. traction 0.288 0.249 -5.102 -10.221 -6.281 -13.333 -6.459 -11.140 -6.842 -15.270 
 (0.569) (0.696) (3.208) (8.211) (6.998) (16.935) (5.837) (10.847) (7.350) (20.882) 
Survey A. employees 0.092 0.161 -0.575 -2.123 -1.274 -3.610 -0.967 -2.541 -1.319 -3.454 
 (0.099) (0.120) (0.656) (1.530) (1.376) (3.988) (1.116) (2.244) (1.461) (4.307) 
Survey A. survival 0.178*** 0.197*** -0.396 -0.114 0.422 0.545 0.187 0.357 0.070 0.549 
 (0.055) (0.069) (0.348) (0.679) (0.640) (0.954) (0.540) (0.674) (0.654) (1.077) 
This table reports the effects of basic acceleration services (cash and coworking space) on venture performance. Estimates are based on the regression 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝜋 +
𝛽𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔) + 𝑋𝑠′𝜌 + 𝜖𝑠, where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a variable that equals 1 if the applicant participated in the accelerator. The outcome variable is 
specified in the title columns of each row. The type of specification is indicated at the top of each column, that is, inclusion of controls, the degree of the polynomial used (p), 
and the bandwidth (h), specified in terms of ranks included around the threshold. If no bandwidth is specified, then the full sample was used. For the OLS estimate, the 
polynomials of the normalized ranking (i.e., 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑔)) are excluded from the estimation. For the RDD estimate, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is instrumented using 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟, a 
variable that equals 1 if the applicant ranks higher than the capacity threshold in its generation. To conserve space, the estimated coefficients for the constant and the polynomial 
terms in the second stage are not presented in the table. The controls included are Chilean, Female, Capital raised before, Prototype, and Young and generation fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Venture performance and the entrepreneurship school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Estimate OLS OLS 
& controls 
p=1  p=1 & controls p=1 & controls 
 & h=1.5 
p=1 & h=1 p=2 & controls 
Web capital indicator 0.091* 0.088* 0.210* 0.207* 0.250 0.312* 0.346 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.118) (0.115) (0.161) (0.189) (0.253) 
Web capital raised 1.633** 1.560** 3.034* 3.008** 4.382** 6.019** 6.345* 
 (0.745) (0.683) (1.576) (1.504) (2.175) (2.667) (3.374) 
Web traction 0.142* 0.134** 0.238* 0.229** 0.354** 0.413** 0.490** 
 (0.077) (0.063) (0.128) (0.115) (0.159) (0.202) (0.243) 
Web employees 0.379 0.400 1.985* 1.890* 2.280* 2.891** 2.760 
 (0.384) (0.349) (1.086) (1.124) (1.374) (1.360) (2.045) 
Web survival 0.100 0.066 0.087 0.107 0.340 0.335 0.257 
 (0.071) (0.068) (0.183) (0.180) (0.255) (0.278) (0.363) 
Survey P. capital indicator 0.329*** 0.346*** 0.455** 0.422** 0.243 0.217 0.200 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.199) (0.210) (0.316) (0.296) (0.403) 
Survey P. capital raised 4.246*** 4.501*** 6.253** 5.739** 3.551 3.613 3.130 
 (1.038) (1.031) (2.533) (2.661) (3.890) (3.711) (4.983) 
Survey P. valuation 2.411* 2.218 5.520* 4.984 8.794* 7.972* 13.752* 
 (1.436) (1.455) (3.284) (3.497) (5.028) (4.590) (7.344) 
Survey P. traction 1.345 1.399 4.226 3.662 2.118 -0.438 0.324 
 (1.197) (1.223) (2.733) (2.868) (4.183) (3.848) (5.202) 
Survey P. employees 0.548** 0.580** 0.871 0.693 0.897 0.779 1.009 
 (0.250) (0.252) (0.550) (0.581) (0.787) (0.749) (1.008) 
Survey P. survival 0.134 0.143 -0.044 -0.142 -0.082 -0.050 -0.007 
 (0.088) (0.090) (0.219) (0.232) (0.316) (0.303) (0.414) 
This table reports the effects of entrepreneurship schooling (bundled with the basic services) on venture performance. Estimates are based on the regression 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝜋 +
𝛽𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ?̆?(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) + 𝑍𝑠′𝜑 + 𝜖𝑠, where 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 is a variable that equals 1 if the participant was selected into the entrepreneurship school and 
𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 3.6) is a pth-degree polynomial of the normalized pitch-day score (i.e., pitch-day score minus the 3.6 cutoff). The outcome variable is specified in the title 
columns of each row, and the type of estimate is specified at the top of each column (i.e., the degree of the polynomial used (p), the bandwidth (h), and the inclusion of controls). 
Columns (5) and (6) include different bandwidth specifications (h) for pitch-day-score ranges of 2.1–5.0 (h=1.5) and 2.6–4.5 (h=1), respectively. For the OLS estimate, the 
polynomials are excluded from the estimation. For the RDD estimate, 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠  is instrumented using 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒, a variable that equals 1 if the participant scored 3.6 or higher on 
the pitch day. To conserve space, the estimated coefficients for the constant and the polynomial terms are not presented in the table. The controls included are Capital raised 
before and generation fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 94 
Table 8. Summary economic magnitude of entrepreneurship schooling effect 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Estimate OLS OLS 
& controls 
p=1  p=1 & controls p=1 & controls 
 & h=1.5 
p=1 & h=1 p=2 & controls 
Web capital indicator 0.126 0.122 0.290 0.286 0.350 0.433 0.478 
Web capital raised 0.159 0.152 0.295 0.293 0.429 0.587 0.617 
Web traction 0.184 0.174 0.307 0.296 0.457 0.531 0.633 
Web employees 0.065 0.069 0.342 0.325 0.405 0.529 0.475 
Web survival 0.083 0.055 0.072 0.088 0.286 0.288 0.212 
Survey P. capital indicator 0.285 0.300 0.394 0.366 0.213 0.194 0.173 
Survey P. capital raised 0.291 0.309 0.429 0.394 0.246 0.255 0.215 
Survey P. valuation 0.149 0.137 0.341 0.308 0.552 0.512 0.849 
Survey P. traction 0.094 0.098 0.295 0.256 0.151 -0.032 0.023 
Survey P. employees 0.105 0.116 0.284 0.222 0.168 0.395 0.126 
Survey P. survival 0.119 0.127 -0.039 -0.127 -0.075 -0.046 -0.007 
 
This table reports the effects of entrepreneurship schooling (bundled with the basic services) on venture performance. Reported coefficients correspond to normalized betas of 
results in Table 7, which can be interpreted as standard deviation changes in the outcome variables. Estimates are based on the regression 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝜋 + 𝛽𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
?̆?(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) + 𝑍𝑠′𝜑 + 𝜖𝑠, where 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 is a variable that equals 1 if the participant was selected into the entrepreneurship school and 
𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 3.6) is a pth-degree polynomial of the normalized pitch-day score (i.e., pitch-day score minus the 3.6 cutoff). The outcome variable is specified in the title 
columns of each row, and the type of estimate is specified at the top of each column (i.e., the degree of the polynomial used (p), the bandwidth (h), and the inclusion of controls). 
Columns (5) and (6) include different bandwidth specifications (h) for pitch-day-score ranges of 2.1–5.0 (h=1.5) and 2.6–4.5 (h=1), respectively. For the OLS estimate, the 
polynomials are excluded from the estimation. For the RDD estimate, 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠  is instrumented using 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒, a variable that equals 1 if the participant scored 3.6 or higher on 
the pitch day. To conserve space, the estimated coefficients for the constant and the polynomial terms are not presented in the table. The controls included are Capital raised 
before and generation fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Online Appendix 
Appendix 1- Parallel between Business Schools and Business Accelerators 








Reputation (Rao 1994; 
Zott and Huy, 2007)  
Certification from selection, 
graduation from business 
school, diploma.  
Certification from selection, 
graduation from 
entrepreneurship school, 
exposure to community.  
Productivity  





& Furr, 2007) 
Developing and growing a 
company through classes, 
professors, guest speakers, 
career office, advisors, 
fellow classmates. 
Developing and growing a 
start-up through workshops, 
staff, guest speakers, industry 




Ketchen, Ireland and 
Snow, 2007) 
Preferential access to peer 
and professor networks. 






selection and graduation (in 
the form of business self-
efficacy) 
Self-confidence from selection 




(Locke and Latham, 
2002; Cialdini and 
Goldstein, 2004) 
Setting learning goals, class 
work, homework, exams. 
Setting strategic tasks, monthly 
follow-up meetings, demo-day 
Note: Although business schools have traditionally not offered entrepreneurship-related instruction in their 
curriculum, in recent years, some business schools have started to include it. 
 
Appendix 2 - Sample Composition 
Panel A in Table 2.1 displays the number of applications judged per generation, as well as the number of 
the following: rejections (i.e., the program extends no offer), selected participants (i.e., the program extends 
an offer), participants (i.e., the start-up accepts the offer), pitch-day competitors (i.e., participants who 
competed to get accepted into the school), and participants in the entrepreneurship school.23 The proportion 
of accepted applicants dropped from roughly 31% in generation 1 to approximately 7% from generation 5 
onward, reflecting the increasing legitimization of the program in the international entrepreneurship 
community. 24 
Table 2.1 shows that 25.87% of applicant start-ups have raised external financing prior to their 
application (Panel B), 91.77% have less than five full-time employees (Panel C), and 56.27% are less than 
six months old (Panel D). The employee size of these companies is comparable to the average company 
size reported by Haltiwanger et al., (2013) for young firms (less than a year old) in the US: 33% have 
between one and four employees. Panel E and F describe the stage of development of applicant start-ups 
                                                          
23 The program imposes no restrictions on reapplications, which constitute 5% of the sample. We kept them in our 
main analysis, but removing them does not materially change the results. 
24 The almost four-fold increase in the number of applicants for generation 2 motivated and increased the capacity 





and the distribution of applicant industries. The distribution is concentrated in IT related sectors such as E-
commerce (18%), IT & Enterprise Software (17%), Mobile and Wireless (9%), and Social Media (12%), 
which is comparable to the industry representation of VC-backed firms in Computers, Electronics and 
Telecom reported by Puri and Zarutskie (2012).  
Table 2.2 describes founder characteristics across generations. Consistent on the objectives of the 
accelerator of attracting foreign entrepreneurs, on average, only 21.3% are Chilean (Panel A). The 
distribution of founders’ age and gender across generations is relatively stable: most founders are between 
25 and 30 years old (Panel B), and the female proportion ranges from 7% to 16% (Panel C). 
A comparison between “Start-Up Chile” and “ED” columns in Tables 2.1- 2.2 reveals the average 
Start-Up Chile applicant is younger, less likely to be female, has a younger and more underdeveloped 
business, and is less likely to have raised finance prior to potential participation than average applicants in 
other ecosystem accelerators worldwide. Indeed, 54.4% (32.33%) Start-Up Chile applicant founders 
(average ecosystem-accelerators—“ED”) are younger than 30 years, 91.77% (68.54%) have less than five 
employees, and 56.27% (21.86%) have start-ups younger than 6 months. Start-Up Chile applicants are, 
however, similar in fundraising to average ecosystem-accelerator applicants: 74.13% (79.28%) of 
applicants to Start-Up Chile (average ecosystem-accelerators) have not raised external financing (not even 
from family or friends) at the time of the application.  
Table 2.1 – Start-up Characteristics at Application by Generation 
Panel A: Applicants and Participants 
 
 
Panel B: Capital Raised at Application 
    Start-Up Chile ED 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % % 
- 1 462 3 13 0 0 0 479   
No (Bootsrapped) 107 10 290 354 492 450 357 2,060 74.13 79.28 
< 50K 10 1 72 72 116 92 134 497 17.88 10.57 
>50K 8 1 29 33 47 39 65 222 7.99 10.15 
Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258     
 
Panel C: Number of Full-Time Workers at Application 
  Start-Up Chile      ED 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % % 
- 126 474 394 9 6 1 0 1,010   
<5 0 0 0 438 596 543 486 2063 91.77 68.54 
Generation Applicants Rejections Selections Participants Competed in Pitch Day Schooled 
1 126 40 86 64   
2 474 324 150 125   
3 394 295 99 85   
4 472 374 98 74 62 13 
5 655 554 101 90 80 15 
6 581 476 105 95 89 18 
7 556 456 100 83 45 13 





5-9 0 0 0 23 45 36 66 170 7.56 16.85 
10+ 0 0 0 2 8 1 4 15 0.67 14.62 
Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258     
 
Panel D: Start-up Age at Application 
 Start-Up Chile ED 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % % 
- 0 2 0 9 6 1 0 18   
Less than 6 months 66 276 231 276 389 352 233 1,823 56.27 21.86 
6-12 months 30 119 108 135 204 174 250 1,020 31.48 29.36 
12-24 months 19 51 33 52 56 54 73 338 10.43 17.10 
More than 2 years 11 26 22 0 0 0 0 59 1.82 31.68 
Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258   
 
Panel E: Industry of Start-up 
 Generation  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % 
- 5 95 64 135 206 83 347 935  
Consulting 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0.13 
E-commerce 32 81 54 57 73 95 35 427 18.38 
Education 0 0 36 26 45 32 25 164 7.06 
Energy & Clean Technology 6 24 10 4 13 10 9 76 3.27 
Finance 6 12 10 7 5 12 5 57 2.45 
Healthcare & Biotechnology 5 0 12 16 15 21 12 81 3.49 
IT & Enterprise Software 29 97 59 48 57 67 30 387 16.66 
Media 0 0 17 22 15 33 7 94 4.05 
Mobile & Wireless 12 53 24 25 42 36 20 212 9.13 
Natural Resources  0 0 6 4 13 10 2 35 1.51 
Other  22 82 32 35 40 48 21 280 12.05 
Social Enterprise 9 30 14 15 20 21 8 117 5.04 
Social Media/Social Network 0 0 40 55 81 79 28 283 12.18 
Tourism 0 0 16 23 27 34 7 107 4.61 
Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258  
 
Panel F: Start-up Development Stage 
 Generation  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % 
- 126 14 2 2 5 0 0 149  
Concept 0 118 100 124 155 137 53 687 22.10 
Scaling Sales 0 21 11 24 19 18 35 128 4.12 





Prototype in Development 0 238 212 235 336 300 273 1,594 51.27 
Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258  
This table describes the composition of the sample, which includes 3,258 applicant start-ups to the accelerator. It also 
describes average applicants to ecosystem accelerators worldwide under the heading “ED,” based on information from 
the Emory Entrepreneurship Database. Percentages are calculated over the number of non-missing responses. Panels 
E and F show the sample composition across different characteristics of start-up applicants. The distribution is 
concentrated in IT-related sectors such as E-commerce (18%), IT & Enterprise Software (17%), Mobile and Wireless 
(9%), and Social Media (12%), which is comparable to the industry representation of VC-backed firms in Computers, 
Electronics and Telecom reported by Puri and Zarutskie (2012). 
 
Table 2.2 – Founder Characteristics at Application by Generation 
Panel A: Location 
 Start-Up Chile ED 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % % 
- 4 82 1 4 3 0 0 94   
Africa 2 4 0 2 7 4 2 21 0.7 19.1 
Asia 10 23 22 40 47 51 80 273 8.6 19.1 
Europe 26 81 79 82 94 110 101 573 18.1 6.6 
N. America 56 142 118 122 112 106 103 759 24.0 34.8 
Oceania 2 8 6 6 12 6 5 45 1.4 0.4 
S. America (exc. Chile) 23 54 73 138 180 138 213 819 25.9 19.4 
Chile 3 80 95 78 200 166 52 674 21.3 0.6 
Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258   
 
Panel B: Age 
 Start-Up Chile ED 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % % 
- 138 462 394 472 136 65 10 1,677   
Younger than 25 0 0 0 0 80 86 70 236 14.9 10.6 
Between 25 and 30 0 0 0 0 193 207 225 625 39.5 21.73 
Between 30 and 35 0 0 0 0 147 122 141 410 25.9 21.64 
Between 35 and 40 0 0 0 0 56 57 64 177 11.2 15.24 
Older than 40 0 0 0 0 43 44 46 133 8.4 30.79 
Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258   
 
 
Panel C: Gender 
 Start-Up Chile ED 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total % % 
- 5 97 76 305 439 83 347 1,352   
Female 8 49 47 24 27 78 28 261 13.7 28.6 





Total 126 474 394 472 655 581 556 3,258   
This table describes the composition of the sample across different characteristics of the founder. For those applicant 
start-ups with multiple founders, only the characteristics of the founder leader (self-reported in application) are 
described. It also describes average applicants to ecosystem accelerators worldwide under the heading “ED,” based 
on information from the Emory Entrepreneurship Database. 
Appendix 3 — Development of Outcome Variables 
Given the fledgling nature of start-ups, the standard metrics used to establish firm performance for more 
mature businesses (e.g., profits or stock price) are not generally available, nor are they particularly useful 
in new venture settings (cf. Puri and Zarutskie, 2012). For example, Facebook purchased Instagram for 
roughly $1 billion when it was only one and a half years old and had neither revenues nor profits. However, 
it had over 100 million active users. Therefore, in keeping with prior literature (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Maurer and Ebers, 2006), we construct performance measures that proxy for venture 
fundraising, venture scale, and venture survival. We use two methods: web searches and surveys.  
Our first web search (conducted during the first quarter of 2014) focused on the Facebook and 
LinkedIn platforms. Our second web search (conducted during the first quarter of 2015) focused on CB 
Insights. Our first survey (conducted during the fourth quarter of 2014) was focused on applicants. Our 
second survey (conducted by the accelerator staff during the first quarter of 2016) was focused on 
participants. Logarithmic transformations of the survey responses are used to reduce the impact of outliers. 
Following, we describe details of each of the data collection methods. 
 
3.1 Web-based Measures 
We hand-collected data using extensive web searches about the start-ups and their founders in online 
platforms (i.e., CB Insights, LinkedIn and Facebook). This approach is similar to that used by previous 
studies such as Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2014), Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller (2007), and Hallen, Bingham, 
and Cohen (2016). We conducted Internet searches of the names of the founders and their start-ups, looking 
for indications of entrepreneurial performance. We searched through Facebook and LinkedIn (CB Insights) 
during the first quarter of 2014 (2015). Because participants in generation 1 (7) entered the program in June 
2011 (2013), these metrics represent outcomes between 0.75 and 2.75 years (2 and 4 years for CB Insights) 
since potential entry into the program. Table 3.1 summarizes the logic we used in constructing the web-based 
measures.  
 
Table 3.1 Internet-based Questions and Variable Definitions 
Construction logic Variable names and definition 
If a start-up becomes relevant enough, it is likely to 
appear on CB Insights. We verified other indicators of 
survival (e.g., whether or not the start-up has a profile on 
LinkedIn or Facebook, or a website), and our results are 
consistent. 
Web Survival equals 1 if the start-up 
has a profile in CB Insights, and 0 
otherwise. 
If a start-up has relevant fundraising activity, that activity 
is most likely to appear on CB Insights. By construction, 
we also code this variable with zero for those that do not 
have a profile on CB Insights. We use detailed 
information about the fundraising date in the platform, 
together with the start-ups’ application date, to classify 
fundraising rounds as post-application.  
Web Capital Indicator equals 1 if the 
start-up has a post-application 
fundraising record, and 0 otherwise. 
This variable equals zero if the start-up has no post-
application fundraising record on CB Insights, if such a 
Web Capital Raised is the natural log 





record exists but does not specify an amount of capital 
raised, or if the start-up has no profile on CB Insights. 
LinkedIn reports the number of employees in ranges 
(e.g., 1-10 employees), which we transform into point 
estimates using the minimum employee size in the range 
(i.e., we assigned an employment level of 1 when the 
reported range was 1-10 employees). We confirmed that 
the transformation rule is immaterial for the results. 
Web Employees is the number of 
employees. 
Because the prevalence of Facebook “likes” varies across 
industries, we verified that results continue to hold when 
we normalize the number of “likes” by industry. 
Web Traction is the natural log of the 
number of thousand Facebook "likes". 
 
3.2  Survey-Performance Outcomes for Start-Up Chile Applicants 
In October of 2014, we sent an email to all applicants to Start-Up Chile, generations 1–7, including the 
3,258 applicants in our sample, inviting them to participate in our survey. Companies in generation 1 
applied to the program in March 2011 (entry to the program being in June 2011), and those from generation 
7 applied in March 2013 (entry in June 2013). Generation 7 graduated from the program in January 2014. 
Therefore, the surveyed population of start-ups had a considerable amount of time since inception and 
graduation from Start-Up Chile. Of the total number of invitations, 184 bounced due to email addresses 
that no longer existed, likely because individuals who applied to the program did so using their start-up’s 
Internet domain name, which may cease to exist when the venture is no longer pursued. Of the remaining 
population, 332 submitted fully completed surveys; the rest initiated but did not submit the survey, or opted 
out. The response rate ranged from 6% for generation 1 to 16% for generation 7. The larger response rate 
for latter generations probably reflects a greater sense of commitment to Start-Up Chile for those more 
recently involved in the program.  
We dropped 176 observations because the respondents did not answer beyond the first few 
questions. We further dropped 24 observations because of response ambiguity, that is, survey respondents 
who declared they had participated in Start-Up Chile, but who were not in the registry of the program, or 
who declared they had not participated in Start-Up Chile, but who were in the program’s registry. This 
process left us with a total of 298 valid survey responses. 
Figure 3.1 plots the distribution of the respondent’s rank around the capacity threshold. The 
distribution exhibits “patches;” for example, no companies ranking between 30-40 below the capacity 
threshold completed the survey. Of the 298 survey responses, 198 correspond to non-participants, 100 
correspond to program participants, and 13 to schooled ventures. Of respondents with a normalized ranking 
between -75 and +75 (-50 and +50), 62 (36) correspond to participants and 39 (5) to non-participants. Table 
3.2 shows the distribution of respondents to the survey of applicants across generations and program status 
(e.g., rejected, schooled etc.) Table 3.3 summarizes the questions asked in the survey and the variable 
definitions and construction logic. 







The figure plots the distribution of survey respondents across the normalized rank. It plots the number of respondents 
in bins of 10 ranks, where observations are at the start-up level. The total number of survey respondents is 298. 
 
Table 3.2 Distribution of Survey Applicant Respondents 
 
The table describes 
the 
composition of the survey respondents, which includes a final sample of 298 ventures. Observations are at the start-
up level. The table summarizes the number of respondents who participated in the accelerator, those who competed 

























-200 -100 0 100 200
Normalized Rank
Gen. Survey Non-resp. Ambig. Resp. Participants Competed  
Pitch Day 
Schooled 
1 126 118  8 3   
2 474 443  31 13   
3 394 366 1 27 9   
4 472 438 5 29 13 13 4 
5 655 598 5 52 17 14 2 
6 581 517 4 60 15 15 3 
7 556 459 6 91 30 15 4 





Table 3.3 Applicant Survey Questions and Variable Definitions 
Question Variable names and definition 
What is the fate of the start-up? 
Potential answers: 
1. The company is alive, but I sold or gave my 
shares to someone else. 
2. The company is alive, and I still own shares, but 
I no longer work primarily at that company. 
3. The company was sold to (or it merged with) 
another company, and it no longer exists as an 
independent entity. 
4. The company is alive and I am currently working 
there. 
5. I pivoted this company into my current start-up. 
6. The start-up is currently on stand-by while I am 
working on starting a new company. 
7. I closed that company and have started a new 
company. 
8. I closed that company and I am not currently 
working at my own startup. 
9. The start-up is currently on stand-by (nobody is 
working on it), and I am not currently working at 








Survey A. Survival equals 1 if answer 
was “The company is alive and I am 
currently working there,” and 0 
otherwise.   
How much money have you raised in US dollars since 
the beginning of your start-up? 
Survey A. Capital Indicator equals 1 
if answer is not zero, and 0 otherwise. 
Survey A. Capital Raised equals 
logarithm of reported capital raised. 
What is your estimated pre-money valuation in US 
dollars? 
Survey A. Valuation equals logarithm 
of reported pre-money valuation. 
What are your accumulated sales in US dollars during the 
last 6 months? 
Survey A. Traction equals logarithm 
of reported sales. 
What is your start-up's "people count" for the following 
categories? 
 Full-time founders 
 Part-time founders 
 Full-time employees 
 Part-time employees 
Survey A. Employees equals the 







3.3 Survey-Performance Outcomes for Start-Up Chile Participants 
During the first quarter of 2016, the Start-Up Chile staff contacted Start-Up Chile alumni. Alumni were 
contacted by email and phone, requesting them to collaborate with a data-acquisition effort. Table 3.4 shows 
the distribution of survey respondents (72.4% response rate). Table 3.5 shows the list of questions that were 
asked of participants. Figure 3.2 plots the distribution of respondent-participants’ pitch-day score. Of the 
183 participants from generations 4–7 who answered the survey, 145 participated in the pitch-day 
competition.  
 
Figure 3.2. Distribution of Survey Respondents across the Pitch-Day Score 
 
The figure plots the distribution of survey respondents across the pitch-day score. It plots the number of respondents 
in bins of 0.1 scores, where observations are at the start-up level. The total number of survey respondents in generations 
4-7 is 183. Respondents are restricted to 145 start-ups that participated during the pitch day and for which we observe 
the pitch-day score. 
 



























0 1 2 3 4 5
Pitch-Day Score
Gen. Surveyed Non-respondent Respondent Competed Pitch Day Schooled 
4 61 26 35 31 8 
5 74 42 32 28 6 
6 83 26 57 53 10 
7 78 19 59 33 11 





Table 3.5 Participant Survey Questions and Variable Definitions 
Question Variable names and definition 
Is your start-up active? 
 
Survey P. Survival equals 1 if answer 
was “yes” and 0 otherwise.  
How much public capital have you raised worldwide 
(including Chile) not considering the Start-Up Chile 
program? (USD) 
 
Survey P. Capital Indicator equals 1 if 
answer is not zero, and 0 otherwise. 
Survey P. Capital Raised equals 
logarithm of reported capital raised.  
How much is your start-up worth according to your last 
formal valuation? 
Survey P. Valuation equals logarithm 
of reported pre-money valuation 
How much have you sold worldwide (including Chile) 
since inception? (USD) 
Survey P. Traction equals logarithm of 
reported sales. 
How many employees does your start-up have 
worldwide? 
Survey P. Employees equals the 
number of reported full-time 
employees 
 
Appendix 4: Complementary Analysis 
 
Figure 4.1 –Variance of pitch-day scores across judges 
 
The figure shows the average variance in pitch-day scores across judges in bins of 0.2 pitch-day scores, and the fitted 
values and 90% confidence interval from the regression 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 = 𝜏 + 𝜇𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒3.6 + 𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝐷𝑎𝑦  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 −
3.6) + 𝜀𝑠, where 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒3.6 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the participant scored above 3.6 on the pitch day, 
and 𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ_𝐷𝑎𝑦  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 3.6) is a first-degree polynomial of the pitch-day score. The vertical line represents the 
informal pitch-day score cutoff of 3.6. The sample is restricted to pitch-day participants in generation 6 for which 
we have detailed data on individual scores by judges. For the rest of the generations, we only have access to the 
final (weighted average) pitch-day score. For each judge, we construct a weighted average score based on the scores 
per criterion and the relative weight of this criterion as defined by Start-up Chile. The weights used for each criterion 
were as follows: problem—30%, solution—20%, business model—20%, market—20% and fundraising needs—
10%. The figure plots the variance in pitch-day scores across judges.  
 


















The figure plots mean outcomes in bins of 0.2 normalized pitch-day scores (i.e., pitch-day score – 3.6), and the 95th 
confidence interval around those means.  
 
Table 4.1- Predictability Pitch-day Scores  
 
 (1) (2) (3)  
Web Capital Indicator     
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒  0.109* 0.136 0.123  
 (0.058) (0.192) (0.096)  
z 0.010 -0.083 0.011  
 (0.023) (0.251) (0.022)  
Web Capital Raised     
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒  1.576** 5.017* 0.866  
 (0.793) (2.726) (1.079)  
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 (0.297) (3.144) (0.285)  
Web Traction     
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒  0.123* 0.527* 0.044  
 (0.066) (0.305) (0.048)  
z -0.013 -0.549 -0.000  
 (0.016) (0.382) (0.013)  
Web Employees     
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒  1.031* 2.951* 0.945  
 (0.552) (1.697) (0.813)  
z -0.515 -3.043* -0.431  
 (0.374) (1.733) (0.394)  
Web Survival     
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒  0.045 -0.163 0.054  
 (0.095) (0.265) (0.132)  
z -0.034 -0.075 -0.048  
 (0.058) (0.251) (0.060)  
Observations 276 59 217  
 
We project venture outcomes on normalized pitch-day scores and an indicator variables of whether the venture scored 
above the informal pitch-day selection rule. The outcome variable is specified in the title columns of each panel. To 
conserve space, the estimated coefficients for the constant are not presented in the table. The controls included are 
Capital Raised Before and generation fixed effects. The sample used in the regression varies across columns: full 
sample (column1), schooled participants (column 2), and non-schooled participants (column 3). Robust standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4.2 Leave-One-Out Procedure to Investigate Impact of Outliers 
Panel A-Web-based metrics 
 Web  
Capital 
Indicator 
Web Capital Raised Web Traction Web Employees Web Survival 
Full p-value  0.0737 0.0472 0.0474 0.0950 0.555 
Full sample (N=276) 
Min coefficient 0.172 2.641 0.161 1.215 0.0756 
Min p-value 0.0401 0.0302 0.0311 0.0751 0.400 
Max p-value 0.115 0.0756 0.0947 0.160 0.687 
Influential Obs. 9 0 0 12 0 
Schooled (N=59) 
Min p-value 0.0401 0.0376 0.0407 0.0859 0.449 
Max p-value 0.115 0.0756 0.0947 0.160 0.647 
Influential Obs. 6 0 0 4 0 
Not-schooled (N=217) 
Min p-value 0.0470 0.0302 0.0311 0.0751 0.400 
Max p-value 0.110 0.0667 0.0683 0.195 0.687 
Influential Obs. 3 0 0 8 0 
Panel B- Survey P.-based metrics 
 Survey P.  
Capital 
Indicator 












Full p-value  0.028 0.018 0.145 0.134 0.817 
All (N=145) 
Min coefficient 0.383 5.077 3.137 0.491 -0.221 
Min p-value 0.0217 0.0157 0.142 0.159 0.372 
Max p-value 0.0960 0.0806 0.314 0.361 0.797 
Influential Obs. 0 0 0 0 0 
Schooled (N=35) 
Min p-value 0.0217 0.0157 0.142 0.173 0.470 
Max p-value 0.0613 0.0473 0.279 0.357 0.673 
Influential Obs. 0 0 0 0 0 
Not schooled (N=110) 
Min p-value 0.0261 0.0178 0.149 0.159 0.372 
Max p-value 0.0960 0.0806 0.314 0.361 0.797 
Influential Obs. 0 0 0 0 0 
The table shows results from “leave-one-out-procedure” to evaluate the influence of outliers. In detail, we re-estimate 
the preferred RDD estimator (corresponding to column 4 in Table 7) for each outcome variable 276 times, leaving out 
a different observation for each estimation. The table reports the minimum and maximum p-values of the 276 leave-
one-out regressions for the web-based (panel A) and survey-based (Panel B) outcome measures. To ease comparison, 
for each outcome variable, we also report the “full sample p-value” of the RDD estimate using the full sample and 
reported in column 4 of Table 7. We further distinguish between observations removed from the Schooled and Non-
schooled sub-samples of participants. For each subpanel, we report the number of influential observations. By 
influential, we mean that the removal of the observation changes the significance level of our results. That is, for 
outcome variables with an average p-value lower (higher) than 10%, influential observations are those whose removal 
results in a p-value larger (lower) than 10%. Close inspection of the table reveals the following patterns: First, we 
have no influential observations for 4 out of the 6 outcome variables with an average p-value lower than 10%. These 
stable outcome variables are Web Capital Raised, Web Traction, Survey P. Capital Indicator, and Survey P. Capital 
Raised. Second, for Web Capital Indicator and Web Employees (the remaining 2 outcome variables with an average 
p-value lower than 10%), the removal of 8 and 12 influential observations renders the results insignificant (from 0.074 
to 0.115, and 0.095 to 0.160). However, point estimates are similar and results thus remain qualitatively the same. 
Third, we have no influential observations for the outcome variables with an average p-value higher than 10%. These 
variables are Web Survival, Survey P. Survival, Survey P. Employees, and Survey P. Traction.  
 
Table 4.3 Demotivation of Pitch-Day Losers 
Panel A: Fraction of winners in same industry 













Winners -0.071 -0.962 1.168 0.017 0.018 
 (0.110) (1.295) (1.438) (0.076) (0.257) 
Above 0.108 0.573 0.889 0.032 0.051 
 (0.088) (1.027) (0.864) (0.051) (0.126) 
z -0.002 0.165 -0.185 0.013 -0.062 
 (0.022) (0.299) (0.441) (0.014) (0.064) 
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 
R-squared 0.167 0.201 0.044 0.107 0.103 
 
Panel B: Fraction of winners in same industry 

















Winners 0.083 0.554 -0.096 -0.047 0.077 
 (0.124) (1.411) (0.954) (0.049) (0.223) 
Above 0.098 0.491 0.933 0.037 0.044 
 (0.083) (0.980) (0.858) (0.050) (0.126) 
z -0.001 0.180 -0.204 0.012 -0.063 
 (0.021) (0.293) (0.436) (0.014) (0.064) 
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 
R-squared 0.168 0.200 0.039 0.108 0.103 
The table shows that performance of losers does not correlate with the fraction of winners. We restrict the sample to 
losers and project venture outcomes based on pitch-day scores, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒, and the fraction of pitch-day winners that are 
in the same reference group as the start-up. As controls, we include Capital Raised Before and generation fixed effects. 
To conserve space, we do not report estimates for the controls. Panel A (B) uses as a reference group the ventures in 
the same industry (and location) of the start-up.   
 
Table 4.4 Power Back-of-the Envelope Calculations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Predicted 
Effect 
Mean  Std.  RCT RDD 
Web Capital Indicator 0.06 0.01 0.12  210   959  
Web Capital Raised 0.11 0.26 1.73  12,069   55,267  
Web Traction -0.11 0.05 0.24  223   1,018  
Web Employees -2.88 0.41 1.71  17   77  
Web Survival 0.43 0.15 0.36  35   155  
Survey A. Capital Indicator -1.61 0.61 0.49 6 21 
Survey A. Capital Raised -16.95 6.19 5.24 6 22 
Survey A. Valuation -6.34 7.33 6.46 50 224 
Survey A. Traction -15.27 3.58 4.53 6 20 
Survey A. Employees -3.45 0.51 0.78 3 12 
Survey A. Survival 0.55 0.56 0.50 40 177 
The table reports back-of-the-envelope calculations of the sample size needed to detect outcome changes in the 
magnitude of the reported coefficients in column 4 of Table 7 with a power of 80%. As a reference, many funding 
agencies consider 80% an appropriate power target (Duflo et al., 2008). Our approach is in the same spirit as McKenzie 
and Woodruff (2014), who use the coefficient of variation (ratio of the standard deviation and the mean) of the outcome 
variables in the baseline survey to estimate the statistical power of different studies. Because we have no baseline 
survey of outcomes, we use as a proxy the standard deviation and mean for outcomes of non-participants. We use a 
test size of 0.05 and the observed sample size ratio of participants to non-participants (0.27). We report two back-of-
the-envelope estimates of the sample size. The first makes no adjustment for the regression method, and estimates the 
sample needed to reject the predicted effect, given the mean and standard deviation of non-participants. All but one 
sample size estimates in column 4 are smaller than 3,258, which would suggest we have enough statistical power to 
reject the null based on our preferred methodology. In column 5, we adjust the back-of-the-envelope calculations to 
take into account the RDD methodology following Schochet (2008). We use an RDD design effect of 4.57, based on 
the 0.53 correlation between participation and the normalized application score.  
 
 
 
 
